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ABSTRACT 
 
 
International Financial Crises, Term Structure of Foreign Debt  
and Monetary Policy in Open Economies. (May 2006) 
Ahmet Caliskan, B.S., Bilkent University; 
M.A., Bilkent University 
Chair of Advisory Committee:   Dr. Paula Hernandez-Verme 
 
 
In this dissertation, I study international financial crises. For this purpose, I build 
two models. In the first model, I focus on financial crises in developing, large open 
economies where foreign debt with various maturities and issue dates is available. The 
objective is to measure the vulnerability of the domestic financial system to domestically 
triggered bank runs and externally triggered sudden stops. The main contribution of this 
model is that both types of crises are treated as rational responses of domestic depositors 
and international creditors. Such vulnerability measures are linked to fundamentals and 
equilibrium term structure of foreign debt. Banks’ vulnerability to runs increases if they 
hold a relatively shorter term debt. Also, a larger cost of liquidating the long-term 
investment before maturity makes the banks more fragile. In the next step, given a 
domestic banking crisis, I allow international creditors to decide whether they want to 
stop lending to domestic banks (in which case a “sudden stop” takes place) or not. A 
sudden stop is more likely if (i) creditors highly discount future consumption, (ii) 
creditors’ current income is small relative to their future income, and (iii) the cost of 
liquidating the long-term investment before maturity is small. 
In the second model, I investigate the merits of alternative monetary policies with 
respect to financial fragility. In this monetary model of an explicit financial system, I 
motivate the demand for two fiat currencies by spatial separation and limited 
communication of agents. There is a domestic and a foreign currency freely traded 
without restrictions. I analyze the policy of a constant growth rate of domestic money 
supply with a floating exchange rate regime. Both currencies are held in positive 
 iv
amounts at the steady-state only if the growth rate of domestic money supply is equal to 
the world inflation rate (WIR). If the former rate is larger than the WIR, domestic 
currency is not held at the steady-state. Also, total real money balances held is 
negatively related with WIR. Finally, monetary policy in the form of a constant growth 
rate of domestic money supply is neutral with respect to welfare. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank my committee chair, Dr. Paula Hernandez-Verme, for her 
guidance, support and patience throughout the course of this research. She contributed 
significantly to my development as a researcher. Also, I thank my committee members, 
Prof. Dennis Jansen, Prof. Qi Li and Prof. Michael Hand, for their useful comments and 
help. For developing my interest in macroeconomics and monetary economics, I thank 
Prof. Leonardo Auernheimer and Dr. Sunanda Roy. For giving me support throughout 
my academic career in economics, I thank Dr. Erdem Başçı and Dr. Savaş Alpay. 
Also, I would like to express my gratitude toward my friends here in College 
Station for their support and companionship throughout my six years in town. In 
particular, I would like to thank Renat Shaykhutdinov, Daniyar Zhussupov, Bilal Akın, 
Bekir Engin Eser, Serkan Güntürk, Arif Oduncu, Süleyman Çiftçi and Mehmet Ayvacı. 
Finally, thanks to my mother, Muazzez Ayşe Çalışkan, and my father, Süleyman 
Çalışkan, for their support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
Page 
ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.................................................................................................. v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................vi 
LIST OF FIGURES.........................................................................................................viii 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ ix 
CHAPTER 
I  INTRODUCTION............................................................................................1 
II  ENDOGENOUS BANK RUNS, SUDDEN STOPS AND TERM 
STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN DEBT IN A LARGE OPEN ECONOMY ...... 5 
  II.1 Introduction .................................................................................... 6 
  II.2 Environment ................................................................................. 13 
   II.2.1 Endowments, Preferences and Informational Structure ... 13 
    II.2.1.1  The Domestic Economy ....................................... 13 
    II.2.1.2  The Rest of the World .......................................... 15 
   II.2.2 The Representative Domestic Bank’s Problem................ 16 
   II.2.3 The Representative International Creditor’s Problem...... 18 
   II.2.4 The Parameter Space and Existence of Equilibria ........... 19 
    II.2.4.1  Assumption on s ................................................... 19 
    II.2.4.2  Assumption on R .................................................. 20 
  II.3 Types of Equilibria....................................................................... 20 
   II.3.1 Overview of Equilibria with No Crises............................ 20 
   II.3.2 Overview of Equilibria When Crises Are Possible .......... 22 
  II.4 Equilibria with No Bank Runs and No Sudden Stops.................. 27 
   II.4.1 Market Clearing Conditions ............................................. 27 
   II.4.2 General Equilibrium and Determinacy ............................ 27 
   II.4.2.1  Equilibria Where the No Arbitrage Condition 
Holds .................................................................... 29 
    II.4.2.2  Equilibria Where the Long-term Rate Is 
        Larger ................................................................... 37 
    II.4.2.3  Equilibria Where the Short-term Rates Are  
        Larger ................................................................... 43 
 
 
 
 
 vii
CHAPTER Page 
  II.5 Equilibria with Runs and/or Sudden Stops .................................. 54 
   II.5.1 System Liquidity and Vulnerability to Runs.................... 54 
    II.5.1.1  Cases Where the No Arbitrage Condition Holds 
        ( 120102 rrr = )........................................................... 56 
    II.5.1.2  Cases Where Long-term Debt Is 
        More Expensive ( ) ............................... 61 120102 rrr >
    II.5.1.3  Cases Where Short-term Debt Is  
        More Expensive ( 120102 rrr < )................................ 61 
    II.5.1.4  Summary of Vulnerability to Bank Runs ............. 62 
  II.5.2 When Do International Creditors Stop Lending to 
Domestic Banks?.............................................................. 63 
    II.5.2.1  The Creditors’ Re-optimization Problem............. 63 
    II.5.2.2  The Insolvency Condition .................................... 66 
    II.5.2.3  Bailout Equilibrium at the Interior Solution ........ 69 
   II.5.3 A Comparison of Closed and Open Financial Systems ... 72 
  II.6 Conclusion.................................................................................... 74 
III FINANCIAL FRAGILITY AND THE CHOICE OF 
 MONETARY POLICY.................................................................................. 76 
  III.1 Introduction .................................................................................. 76 
  III.2 Environment ................................................................................. 77 
  III.2.1 Endowments, Preferences, Assets and the Information 
Structure ........................................................................... 77 
  III.2.2 The Representative Domestic Bank’s Problem................ 79 
  III.2.3 Restrictions on Parameter Space ...................................... 82 
 III.3 Steady-State Equilibria with No Crises........................................ 82 
  III.3.1 Market Clearing Conditions ............................................. 83 
  III.3.2 Steady-State Equilibria and Implications ......................... 83 
 III.4 Conclusion.................................................................................... 86 
IV  CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 88 
 IV.1 Possible Extensions ...................................................................... 90 
REFERENCES................................................................................................................. 92 
APPENDIX A .................................................................................................................. 94 
VITA .............................................................................................................................. 112 
 
 
 viii
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
FIGURE Page 
2.1.1 Timeline of Events with No Crises ............................................................. 21 
2.1.2 Possible Events with Possible Crises Originated Domestically.................. 23 
2.2 Equilibrium Interest Rates for Cases 1.A and 1.B ...................................... 34 
2.3 Equilibrium Interest Rates for Case 1.C...................................................... 36 
2.4 Equilibrium Interest Rates for Cases 2.A and 2.C ...................................... 41 
2.5 Equilibrium Interest Rates for Cases 2.B and 2.C....................................... 42 
2.6 Equilibrium Interest Rates for Case 2.D ..................................................... 42 
2.7 Equilibrium Interest Rates for Case 3.A ..................................................... 49 
2.8 Equilibrium Interest Rates for Case 3.B.1................................................... 50 
2.9 Equilibrium Interest Rates for Case 3.B.2................................................... 51 
2.10 Equilibrium Interest Rates for Case 3.C.1................................................... 52 
2.11 Equilibrium Interest Rates for Case 3.C.2................................................... 53 
2.12 Illiquidity Threshold for Case 1.B.1............................................................ 58 
2.13 Illiquidity Threshold for Case 1.B.2............................................................ 59 
2.14 Illiquidity Threshold for Case 1.B.3............................................................ 60 
2.15 Simulation Results of Bailout Equilibrium ................................................. 70 
2.16 Total Indebtedness in No Crisis and Bailout Cases .................................... 72 
3.1 Timeline of Events ...................................................................................... 80 
3.2 Steady-state Equilibria ................................................................................ 85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ix
LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE Page 
2.1 Sets of Equilibria When the No Arbitrage Condition Holds....................... 30 
2.2 Sets of Equilibria When Long-term Rates Are Larger................................ 38 
2.3 Sets of Equilibria When Short-term Rates Are Larger ............................... 44 
2.4 Banks’ Vulnerability to Runs...................................................................... 55 
2.5 Creditor Re-optimization ............................................................................ 64 
2.6 Creditor’s Choice of Bailout or Sudden Stop ............................................. 71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 After the Mexican (1995) and the Asian (1997) financial crises, the theoretical 
literature on emerging market crises has changed direction both in terms of the 
mechanism and the determinants of crises. The first and the second generation models of 
crises had emphasized the unsustainability of a fixed exchange rate regime under a 
speculative attack in the former and under macroeconomic problems in the latter. 
However, these models of currency crises could not explain, for example, the severe 
recessions that followed all three crisis episodes mentioned above. Therefore, a new type 
of model was needed to explain the “twin crises” of banking problems on the one hand 
and balance of payments problems on the other. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) showed 
that problems in the banking sector typically precede a currency crisis. One strand of 
literature emphasized the role of financial intermediaries and liquidity effects in 
emerging market crises. In this line of research, Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), 
Radelet and Sachs (1998, 2000) and Chang and Velasco (2000a, 2000b) viewed twin 
crises as manifestations of banking system problems in the foreign exchange market. In 
addition to the mechanism of the crisis, these papers also changed the folk view on the 
determinants of whether and when the crises occur. The earlier literature held that crises 
were largely predictable given unsustainable policies and fundamentals, dubbed the 
“fundamentalist” view. This view was unable to explain the Mexican and Korean crises 
because both of these economies were viewed as success stories on the eve of their 
catastrophe. Both countries were newly admitted to OECD and Mexico became a 
member of the North American Free Trade Agreement in November 1993. After the 
catastrophe in those countries, authors cited above have argued that there was a strong 
self-fulfilling element in the unfolding of events.  
 This dissertation focuses on the Mexican (1995), the Asian (1997) and the 
Turkish (2001) financial crises. Following the same line of literature mentioned, I focus 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of The American Economic Review. 
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on the role of financial intermediaries and their fragility. Radelet and Sachs (2000) 
report that in Philippines, Thailand and Korea, foreign liabilities of the commercial 
banking system increased rapidly during the period of 1990-1996. In addition, those 
liabilities were significant as a share of GDP, ranging from 9.2 % in Malaysia to 26.8 % 
in Thailand in 1996. They also point out that a sudden withdrawal of international funds 
to the region was a major cause of the Asian crisis.  
 Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) observe similar patterns in the period of 1990-
1994 leading up to the 1995 Mexican crisis. Capital inflows increased until they abruptly 
stopped through a financial panic. The same authors showed that the relatively short-
term composition of foreign liabilities contributed to the vulnerability of the banking 
system. 
 In Chapter II of this dissertation, I focus on the role of international capital 
inflows in problems of the domestic banking system. This chapter is similar in spirit to 
Chang and Velasco (2000a) as I explicitly build an open banking system with 
microfoundations using Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) paradigm. Banks are allowed to 
borrow foreign capital at various maturities and issue dates from international creditors. 
Also, banks are subject to runs from their domestic depositors. However, in contrast to 
Chang and Velasco (2000a), I develop a world general equilibrium model in which I 
explicitly consider the behavior of international creditors. Equilibrium supply of capital 
and the interest rates on debt are endogenously determined through the interactions 
between domestic banks and international creditors. Creditors make initial lending plans 
based on good expectations about the future. However, according to the developments in 
the domestic economy, those funds are subject to “sudden stops” if creditors find it 
optimal to stop lending to banks. I ask the following questions. How are the maturity and 
term structure of the foreign liabilities of a banking system related to its vulnerability to 
runs? How, if at all, is the risk of a crisis related to fundamentals of the domestic 
economy and the rest of the world? Once a bank run takes place, how is the risk of a 
sudden stop related to the same fundamentals?  
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 I find that risk of a bank run is very closely related to the choice of foreign debt 
maturity. A relatively shorter term debt maturity increases the risk of a liquidity crisis. 
Also, equilibrium term structure of interest rates is a relevant indicator of risk. In the 
presence of multiple equilibria with various interest rate configurations, larger short-term 
interest rates relative to long-term rates are associated with a greater risk of crisis. The 
nature of the investment technology in the domestic economy is an important indicator 
of the fragility of the financial system. If the cost of liquidating the long-term investment 
before maturity is relatively large, then the system is more prone to crises. In the next 
step, given a domestic bank run, I evaluate the risk of a sudden withdrawal of funds by 
international creditors. To an important extent, I find that the risk of a sudden stop is 
closely related to global fundamentals. First, a sudden stop is more likely if creditors’ 
current income is small relative to their future income. Second, it is more likely if 
creditors highly discount future consumption. Third, a smaller cost of liquidating the 
long-term asset before maturity makes a sudden withdrawal more likely.  
 Akyüz and Boratav (2003) note the large extent of foreign borrowing made by 
Turkish commercial banks on the eve of the 2001 crisis. The banking system had large 
short-term, dollar-denominated liabilities. Chang and Velasco (2000b) studied the choice 
of monetary policy and the exchange rate regime with respect to the financial fragility of 
a banking system. They evaluated currency boards, fixed exchange rates and flexible 
exchange rates with and without the Central Bank acting as a lender of last resort. In 
Chapter III of this dissertation, I investigate the effect of alternative monetary policies on 
financial fragility. I include two fiat currencies, domestic and foreign, that circulate 
freely in my general equilibrium model. The important contribution of my model is that I 
take the definition of a fiat currency seriuosly in that both currencies are intrinsically 
useless. I use spatial separation and limited communication of agents to motivate the 
demand for these currencies. This is in contrast to the treatment of Chang and Velasco 
(2000b) who assume that domestic money holdings generate utility. Also, deviating from 
their three-period framework, I study an overlapping-generations-model with an infinite 
sequence of two-period lived generations. As a first step, I find the steady-state 
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equilibria of the model under the policy of a fixed growth rate of domestic money supply 
and a floating exchange rate regime. For both currencies to be held in positive amounts 
at the steady-state, the growth rate of domestic money supply (and hence the domestic 
inflation rate) must be equal to the world inflation rate (WIR). If, on the other hand, the 
growth rate of domestic money supply is larger than WIR, then the domestic currency is 
not held in steady-state equilibrium. The implication is that the choice of monetary 
policy is critical to which of the two currencies is held in equilibrium. However, I also 
find that monetary policy in the form of a constant growth rate of domestic money 
supply is neutral with respect to social welfare. The WIR and total (domestic and 
foreign) real currency balances held in equilibrium have a negative relationship. The 
relationship between the WIR and welfare depends on the initial level of WIR. If the 
initial level is larger (smaller) than some critical level, then a rise in the WIR implies a 
rise (fall) in welfare.  
 In Chapter IV of this dissertation, I draw some conclusions and point to some 
extensions of the models discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5
CHAPTER II 
 
ENDOGENOUS BANK RUNS, SUDDEN STOPS AND  
TERM STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN DEBT  
IN A LARGE OPEN ECONOMY 
 
 This chapter constructs a model of a financial system in a large open economy 
where foreign liabilities that are date-specific and maturity-specific are available. The 
maturity structure of debt and term structure of interest rates are both determined 
endogenously through the interaction of domestic banks and international creditors. In 
this environment, financial crises in the form of domestic bank runs and/or international 
sudden stops might arise endogenously. I use a world general equilibrium approach and 
consider optimizing international creditors. First, I measure the vulnerability of the 
domestic financial system to bank runs and sudden stops. Second, I link such 
vulnerabilities to fundamentals of the economy. The purpose is to design a mechanism 
that can potentially select “healthy” equilibria over crisis equilibria. I measure 
vulnerability of domestic banks to runs by their liquidity position. Longer maturity of 
foreign liabilities improves the liquidity position of banks. A larger cost of liquidating the 
long-term asset before maturity increases the risk of bank runs. Once a bank run occurs, I 
measure the vulnerability of the domestic financial system to sudden stops by the 
solvency position of the banks. International creditors stop lending and a sudden stop 
occurs if banks are insolvent. Creditors stop lending if their cost from reduced current 
consumption outweighs their benefit from future loan repayments. Therefore, a sudden 
stop is more likely if (i) creditors highly discount future consumption, (ii) creditors’ 
current income is small relative to their future income, and (iii) the cost of liquidating the 
long-term asset before maturity is small. Third, I compare my open financial system 
which is allowed to borrow international capital to closed financial systems in terms of 
financial fragility. I find that access to international capital markets reduces the 
vulnerability to outcomes in which some domestic agents are left without consumption.  
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II.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I analyze financial crises in developing large open economies 
where foreign debt with different maturities is available. I restrict my attention to 
unexpected financial crises that can take the form of bank runs and/or sudden stops. The 
focus is on economies in which the private sector is a net foreign borrower and where 
the financial system is mostly composed of banks. Deviating from the previous 
literature, I explicitly allow for different types of foreign debt that are date-specific and 
maturity-specific. In addition, the corresponding equilibrium term structure of interest 
rates is determined endogenously by the interaction of banks and international creditors 
in the markets for these assets. 
 During the early 1990s, two stylized facts were observed in the world economy: 
first, there was a sharp increase in capital flows from developed economies into 
emerging market economies. Second, the financial sectors in most recipient countries 
appeared to be healthy. However, later in the decade and into the early 2000s, both facts 
were reversed in some borrower economies such as Mexico (1994-1995), East Asia 
(1997-1998) and Turkey (2000-2001). Several elements have been blamed to have 
caused these crises. On the domestic side, some people blamed the banks’ illiquid 
positions. On the international side, “sudden stops” of capital inflows were thought to be 
the trigger of such crises. Specifically, the term “sudden stop” in this chapter refers to a 
situation where gross capital inflows become zero instead of the expected or planned 
positive inflows for that point in time1. Regardless of the alleged causes of those crises, 
the financial systems in these countries collapsed and millions of individuals were 
directly affected by the adverse consequences. In addition, these economies shared some 
common characteristics. First, their private sectors were net borrowers from the rest of 
the world. Second, their financial systems were relatively less developed and regulatory 
mechanisms such as deposit insurance and banking supervision were either non-existent 
or inefficient. Third, they had higher real interest rates than developed economies. 
                                                 
1 Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005) define sudden stops as “abrupt declines in capital inflows”. 
Hutchison and Noy (2004) include in the definition the simultaneous occurrence of currency/balance of 
payments crisis with a reversal in capital inflows. The definition I use in this chapter is closer to Chari, 
Kehoe and McGrattan (2005) since I have a non-monetary economy in this chapter. 
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 This chapter is a theoretical exercise that focuses on such economies. Chang and 
Velasco (2000) studied those economies by modeling the domestic financial system 
explicitly from microfoundations. However, they assumed that these economies are 
small open economies facing exogenous international interest rates. Moreover, they 
considered trivial international lenders in the sense that external borrowing was 
constrained exogenously. In my model, I consider a world general equilibrium approach 
where international creditors follow an optimizing behavior. This approach allows both 
bank runs and sudden stops to be the outcome of the individuals’ rational behavior when 
facing unexpected sunspots from different sources. Seo (2003) studied a world general 
equilibrium model, but she only included one short-term debt instrument and did not 
consider debt maturity. In this chapter, I am addressing the following issues. First, I 
assess the vulnerability of the economy to either bank runs and/or sudden stops. Second, 
I investigate whether I can link such vulnerability measures to fundamentals of both the 
domestic and the global economy, with the purpose of designing a mechanism that can 
potentially select “healthy” equilibria. 
In order to address these issues, I imagine the world as consisting of two large 
economies: a developing domestic economy and a developed rest of the world. I 
explicitly model the financial system in the domestic economy using Diamond and 
Dybvig’s (1983) approach for an open economy. Domestic banks provide insurance 
against a liquidity preference shock faced by domestic agents (depositors). In addition, 
banks are able to borrow internationally at various maturities and issue dates. The rest of 
the world is composed of many creditors who are natural lenders.  
In such an environment, both maturity structure of foreign debt and term 
structure of interest rates are endogenously determined through the interactions between 
domestic banks and international creditors. Both bank runs and sudden stops may arise 
endogenously. In this chapter, I only consider unexpected sunspots observed by 
domestic depositors.  
As a first step, I present and discuss equilibria where no crises take place. This is 
already an important contribution to the literature because it allows me to characterize 
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equilibria in terms of maturity structure of foreign debt and the term structure of interest 
rates. Then, I present equilibria where crises are possible. As an example, I analyze 
crises originated domestically as a sunspot observed by domestic depositors. Then I 
characterize such equilibria in terms of solvency of banks. When a sunspot is observed, 
depositors check the liquidity condition of banks. If banks are illiquid, that is, if their 
potential liabilities exceed their potential assets, then a bank run occurs: all deposits are 
withdrawn early. Otherwise, no crises take place and domestic depositors behave 
according to their original plan. So the illiquidity condition is a measure of vulnerability 
of the financial system to bank runs. Next, when a bank run takes place, I analyze the 
conditions under which international creditors choose to stop lending or otherwise bail 
the banks out. If the international creditors stop lending, a sudden stop arises. 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) did an excellent job of illustrating the economic 
role of a bank. They offered an explanation of how banks vulnerable to runs can attract 
deposits. The environment they built has four ingredients. First, there is individual 
uncertainty over desired times of consumption. In a three-date economy, individuals of 
the impatient type wish to consume only in the second date and individuals of the patient 
type wish to consume only in the third date. Agents do not know their types in the first 
date when they need to make investment and consumption decisions. There is no 
aggregate uncertainty, and the probability of being of either type is public information. 
The second ingredient is that information of a particular individual’s type is private and 
cannot be verified. This rules out insurance contracts based on type information. It also 
makes runs on banks possible as a patient depositor could misrepresent her type and 
withdraw early. The third ingredient is the availability of liquid and illiquid assets with 
smaller and larger returns respectively. The fourth ingredient is the sequential service 
constraint: the bank serves its customers on a first-come, first-served basis2. Within this 
environment, they demonstrated that the demand deposit contract offered by the bank 
achieves better allocations compared to autarky. They also showed the existence of a 
bank run equilibrium where patient agents misrepresent their type and rush to withdraw 
                                                 
2 Neil Wallace (1998) derives the sequential service constraint from more primitive assumptions such as 
physical isolation of depositors from each other. 
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in the second date. This causes the bank to liquidate part or all of its long-term assets and 
possibly validate fears of a close-down, yielding lower welfare than in autarky. 
Chang and Velasco (2000) applied the Diamond and Dybvig setup to the case of 
a small open economy. One of their objectives was to determine how a bank should 
optimally arrange the maturity of its foreign liabilities. They modeled their domestic 
economy as composed of a continuum of perfectly competitive banks. They allowed 
these banks to borrow external funds. However, by virtue of the small economy 
assumption, they did not model international creditors’ behavior explicitly. Therefore the 
international debt markets had trivial and exogenous interest rates in their world partial 
equilibrium model. Moreover, they imposed an exogenous limit on foreign borrowing in 
order to ensure the existence of equilibria. Supply of loans was perfectly elastic up to 
this exogenous limit. In this chapter, I model a large open domestic economy. There are 
no such exogenous constraints on foreign borrowing. The only limit to borrowing is the 
willingness and resources of international creditors. In my model, they solve their own 
lifetime utility maximization problem. Domestic banks and international creditors 
participate in free debt markets where interest rates are endogenously determined. Thus, 
the term structure of foreign debt is nontrivial and endogenous.  
Seo (2003) studies a world general equilibrium model with a large open economy 
similar to this chapter. However, unlike this chapter, she focuses only on short-term debt 
and does not study the choice of foreign debt maturity or the term structure of interest 
rates. Moreover, while in her paper the cause of a domestic bank run is the pessimistic 
expectations of the international creditors, in this chapter it is the pessimistic 
expectations of domestic depositors. 
My analysis of different types of equilibria proceeds in two stages. At the initial 
stage, I describe equilibria where no crises take place: these are separating equilibria 
where agents behave according to their true type. At this stage, I find that there exist 
equilibria both when the no arbitrage condition holds and does not hold. By the term “no 
arbitrage condition”, I refer to the comparison of the equilibrium long-term interest rate 
and short-term interest rates compounded over the same time to maturity. Based on this 
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comparison, there are three categories of equilibria: long-term rate can be equal to (in 
which case the no arbitrage condition holds), greater than, or smaller than short-term 
rates compounded over the same time to maturity. Equilibrium maturity structure of debt 
is closely related to the equilibrium term structure of interest rates. In particular, if the 
long-term interest rate is larger (smaller) than the compounded short-term interest rates, 
equilibrium debt borrowed is long-term (short-term)3. If the no arbitrage condition holds, 
the equilibrium maturity structure of debt usually cannot be uniquely determined4, with 
varying degrees of determinacy of the equilibrium interest rates. These results show that 
modeling the behavior of international creditors explicitly can provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of how international capital markets work. 
Indeterminacy and multiplicity characterize the sets of separating equilibria. 
Indeterminacy is observed both in terms of equilibrium interest rates (price 
indeterminacy) and quantities of various debt instruments traded (quantity 
indeterminacy). I classify different sets of equilibria according to the degree of price 
determinacy. The equilibrium price (interest rates) vector can be unique, locally unique 
or irregular5. Quantity indeterminacy is mostly observed when the no arbitrage condition 
holds. This observation can be interpreted as an apparent tradeoff between price 
determinacy and quantity determinacy. When the price vector is more determinate, the 
quantity vector is less determinate and vice versa. 
At the second stage I analyze the equilibria in which bank runs are possible. One 
of the distinguishing features of my approach in this chapter is that a bank run takes 
place as a completely unexpected, surprise event that is triggered by the adverse beliefs 
(sunspots) of domestic depositors6. Unlike Chang and Velasco (2000), there is no 
                                                 
3 Here, I am referring to the choice between the two debt instruments that are available to the domestic 
economy for the initial date of the model. As will be explained later, there is a third short-term debt 
instrument available to the domestic economy for the second date of the model. The latter debt amount is 
always positive in all equilibria with no crises. 
4 Except in one corner solution. 
5 “Locally unique” refers to uniqueness of relative prices. If the price vector does not show relative price 
uniqueness, then I refer to it as “irregular”. See section II.4 for details. 
6 There could be other potential sources of crises, such as sunspots of international creditors. I find that the 
source of the crisis matters, but due to lack of space, I focus on the sunspots of domestic agents in this 
chapter.  
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exogenous probability of a bank run that agents can take into account when they make 
their date-zero decisions in my three-date economy. As I have explained above, when a 
sunspot is observed, depositors check the liquidity condition of banks. If banks are 
illiquid then a bank run occurs. Otherwise, no crises take place and depositors behave 
according to their true type. Thus the liquidity condition is a measure of vulnerability of 
the financial system to bank runs. I find that illiquidity condition depends on two factors: 
equilibrium debt maturity structure and the fundamentals of both the domestic economy 
and the rest of the world. First, longer maturity of foreign debt improves the liquidity 
position of banks. As a result, banks are more (less) vulnerable to bank runs when 
compounded short-term interest rates are larger (smaller) compared to long-term rates: 
this is because in that case, debt maturity is short-term (long-term) in equilibrium7. 
Second, among other parameters, a larger cost of liquidating the long-term investment 
before maturity makes the banks more fragile. 
Once a bank run happens, the international creditors re-evaluate some of their 
date-zero decisions at date one. In this chapter, I assume that after a bank run, the 
equilibrium interest rates on debt stay constant at their levels before the run. However, I 
allow creditors to re-evaluate and adjust the amounts of lending under the new 
conditions. In particular, they decide whether they are going to stop lending or lend an 
amount sufficient to bail the banks out of the crisis. They make this decision only on the 
basis of the new information and their own lifetime utility maximization problem (hence 
the term endogenous sudden stops in my title). First, I show that there cannot be any 
equilibrium where creditors lend a positive amount but the banks collapse at date one 
and cannot repay. Creditors either do not lend at all and banks collapse (sudden stop) or 
they lend an amount that will enable the banks to survive the crisis and repay their new 
                                                 
7 This may appear counter-intuitive at first. To illustrate why I find such a pattern, consider the following 
example. Suppose the long-term rate is smaller than compounded short-term rates over the same maturity. 
In this case, banks want to borrow completely long-term, but the international creditors do not want to 
lend long-term at all (their supply of long-term debt is zero). Then there cannot be any equilibrium with 
positive long-term debt. On the other hand, equilibrium short-term debt must be positive, because the sum 
of short-term and long-term debt must be positive by the creditor’s problem explained below. This is due 
to the net borrower property of the domestic private sector. As a result, equilibrium debt maturity is found 
to be short-term. In summary, I find that supply side has a greater bargaining power in my framework.   
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debt (bailout). Second, I explore the insolvency condition under which creditors choose 
to stop lending or otherwise bail the banks out. A sudden stop occurs if the creditors’ 
cost from current reduced consumption outweighs their benefit from future loan 
repayments. Therefore, a sudden stop is more likely if the creditors’ current endowment 
is small relative to their future endowment. Also, it is more likely if the cost of 
liquidating the long-term investment before maturity is small. Lastly, if the creditors 
highly discount future consumption over current consumption, a sudden stop is more 
likely.  
It is worth stressing that my model is rich enough to allow outcomes in which 
creditors rationally choose to bail the banks out of a bank run. This happens when 
creditors find the banks solvent, i.e. the insolvency condition is not satisfied. As an 
example, I show the existence of a bailout equilibrium.  
Lastly, I compare my open financial system which is allowed to borrow foreign 
capital to closed financial systems in terms of vulnerability to crises. In particular, access 
to international capital markets seems to reduce the vulnerability to very bad outcomes 
in which some domestic agents are left without consumption. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section II.2 describes the 
environment and the interaction between different types of agents. Section II.3 presents 
an overview of the different types of equilibria that may arise. Section II.4 presents and 
characterizes equilibria with no bank runs and no sudden stops. Section II.5 
characterizes equilibria where bank runs occur, and the circumstances under which a 
sudden stop can also be triggered. Section II.6 presents the main conclusion of my study 
and future extensions in this line of research. 
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II.2 Environment  
Consider a large open economy version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
setup, in the spirit of Chang and Velasco (2000). The model I present in this chapter 
features two most distinguishing elements. First, I use a world general equilibrium 
approach by modeling explicitly the behavior of international creditors8. I consider the 
interaction and market clearing between banks and international creditors explicitly. 
Second, I introduce date-specific and maturity-specific international debt instruments9. 
In particular, I consider two short-term debt instruments that are date-specific and one 
long-term debt instrument. 
 The world consists of only two pure exchange economies. The domestic 
economy is a large open economy in which the private sector is a net borrower from the 
rest of the world. The second economy can be thought of as the rest of the world and it 
will henceforth be called so. 
At each date there is a single tradable investment/consumption good. This good 
is homogeneous across countries. The world economy lasts for three dates, indexed 
by , 1 and 2. At , a population of domestic agents is born in the domestic 
country and a population of international agents is born in the rest of the world. For 
simplicity and without much loss of generality, I normalize the size of the population in 
each country to a continuum of agents with unit mass.  
0=t 0=t
II.2.1 Endowments, Preferences and Informational Structure 
II.2.1.1 The Domestic Economy 
Each domestic agent is endowed with g units of the single good at birth, but 
nothing at  and . All domestic agents are ex ante (as of ) identical. 
However, they face uncertainty regarding their consumption patterns. Ex post (as of 
), they are of one of two types. With probability π, a domestic agent is of the 
“impatient” type and wishes to consume the good only at 
1=t 2=t 0=t
1=t
1=t ; with probability 1-π, she 
is of the “patient” type and wishes to consume the good only at 2=t . Every domestic 
                                                 
8 One exception in the previous literature is Seo (2003). 
9 Seo (2003) considers only one short-term debt instrument. 
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agent learns her type at the beginning of 1=t . The probability π is public information. 
Also, type realizations are i.i.d. across domestic agents. Then, by the law of large 
numbers, π is also the fraction of impatient agents in the domestic economy. However, 
the information regarding an individual’s type and her consumption and investment 
activities is private and it cannot be observed or verified by others. Hence, while there is 
individual uncertainty regarding preferences, there is no aggregate uncertainty. 
Let x denote the consumption of a domestic agent at 1=t  if she is of impatient 
type, and y denote her consumption at 2=t  if she is of patient type. To fix ideas, I use a 
logarithmic utility function. Then, as of 0=t , a domestic agent’s expected utility can be 
written as 
( )[ ] )ln()1()ln(,0 yxyxUE ππ −+= .     (1)  
 Following Diamond and Dybvig, there is an illiquid technology available to 
agents and financial institutions of the domestic economy. One unit of the good invested 
at can be transformed into capital that yields 0=t R  units of the consumption good 
at . However, this is an illiquid asset in the sense that once one unit of the good is 
invested at , an early liquidation at 
2=t
0=t 1=t  yields a return of s units of the consumption 
good where 10Rs < . One of the key elements of this chapter is to allow for non-trivial 
interest rates corresponding to each date and debt maturity. Therefore, unlike Diamond 
and Dybvig, I do not allow for a one-to-one storage technology of the consumption good 
between  and 0=t 1=t 11. However, only individual domestic agents can potentially go 
underground and store goods between 1=t and 2=t  receiving a gross rate of return 
equal to one12. As I will show later, this assumption is necessary to allow the patient 
agents to have the option to withdraw early by misrepresenting their type at . Notice 1=t
                                                 
10 Here, for the sake of remaining as general as possible, I do not restrict liquidation value s to be less than 
one, as earlier literature did. In fact, since storage of the consumption good is not allowed between 
and , liquidation value s will be compared to the short-term interest rate between  and 0=t 1=t 0=t 1=t , 
not to one. 
11 Otherwise, if I were to allow for the storage of the good, by no arbitrage condition, all interest rates 
would be equal to one unless there is a default risk. 
12 By assumption, this storage technology is never available to coalitions of domestic depositors (banks) or 
international creditors. It is only available to individual depositors between t=1 and t=2. This assumption 
gives the depositors an alternative asset between these dates so that they can misrepresent their type and 
abscond goods. 
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that if domestic agents could not store and abscond the good at this date, there would 
never be bank runs in equilibrium. 
 As it is standard in the literature, one can easily show that in the environment 
described, coalitions of domestic agents organized as a bank can achieve superior 
outcomes relative to autarky where agents make consumption and investment decisions 
individually. This is due to the fact that in autarky, an individual agent will invest her 
entire endowment in the illiquid asset. Then, in case of the unfortunate event that she 
turns out to be impatient, she will liquidate her entire investment at a loss. However, the 
absence of aggregate uncertainty enables the banks to pool resources and completely 
avoid liquidation in the case where bank runs are not possible. However, as the previous 
literature made it clear, in the case where there is a run on the banks, the resulting 
allocations may be worse than autarky13. Henceforth I assume that there is a continuum 
of perfectly competitive banks in the domestic economy, and I will call domestic agents 
depositors. 
II.2.1.2 The Rest of the World 
 In the rest of the world, each international agent is endowed with m, n and b units 
of the good at ,  and 0=t 1=t 2=t  respectively. For simplicity, I assume that there is 
no investment or storage technology available to agents born in the rest of the world. 
However, international agents have access to the international debt markets, and they are 
natural lenders in these markets. Hence, from now on I will call them international 
creditors. Each creditor wishes to consume at both 1=t  and 2=t . Let u and v denote 
the consumption of an international creditor at 1=t  and 2=t , respectively. Then, I can 
write her lifetime utility as 
( ) )ln()ln(, vuvuU β+=      (2) 
where again, to fix ideas, I use a logarithmic utility function and 10 ≤< β  is the 
intertemporal discount rate.  
 I assume that international creditors can invest in the domestic economy only 
through domestic banks. In other words, while domestic depositors individually do not 
                                                 
13 See Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Cooper and Ross (1998), Ennis and Keister (2004) for more on this. 
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have access to international debt markets, coalitions of them organized as banks do. In 
making such an assumption, I follow the observation made by Diamond and Rajan 
(2000) about the 1997-98 Asian crisis that most of the foreign borrowing made was 
made by domestic banks, rather than domestic individuals14.  
There are three markets for debt where banks borrow from international 
creditors. Let dij denote the equilibrium amount of debt of a bank contracted at date i and 
has to be repaid at date j. There are two markets for short-term debt where equilibrium 
amounts borrowed are denoted by d01 and d12. The corresponding gross real interest rates 
are r01 and r12. In addition, there is a long-term debt option for both banks and 
international creditors:  d02 denotes the equilibrium amount borrowed at  and to be 
repaid at .  The corresponding equilibrium gross real interest rate is r
0=t
2=t 02. Each bank, 
creditor and depositor takes the interest rates r01, r12 and r02 on these debt instruments as 
given when they make their consumption, borrowing and lending decisions at . 0=t
II.2.2 The Representative Domestic Bank’s Problem 
The banking arrangement in this environment is described as follows. Each bank 
offers a demand deposit contract that promises to pay x units of the consumption good to 
domestic depositors who withdraw at 1=t , and y units to domestic depositors who 
withdraw at . Accepting this contract, domestic agents deposit their entire 
endowment of g units of the good with banks at 
2=t
0=t . At 0=t , the bank determines its 
demand for each of the three loans available: short-term (dd01 and dd12) and long-term 
(dd02)15. Thus, in addition to deposits g, the resources of the representative bank at t=0 
include the short-term dd01 and the long-term dd02 loans. The bank invests these resources 
in the long-term asset in order to maximize the representative domestic depositor’s 
expected utility (1). Denoting by k the amount invested in long-term asset,  
                                                 
14 Exception is Indonesia. A possible justification as to why international creditors would not lend to 
individual depositors may be the advantages of the domestic banks over international banks in collecting 
agent-specific information regarding credit-worthiness. Alternatively, there could be minimum capital 
requirements for access to international credit markets that individuals could not meet. Seo (2003) justifies 
this assumption by noting that agents can hide and avoid repayment while banks can always be located by 
creditors.  
 
15 Here, superscripts in ddij indicate demand function. Later, when I will discuss international creditors’ 
problem, I will have dsij as indicating supply of funds in the debt markets.   
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0201
dd ddgk ++≤       (3) 
is the resource constraint faced by the bank corresponding to 0=t .  
The representative bank’s source of funds for 1=t  includes additional short-term 
borrowing at the amount of dd12. In addition, its second source of funds is the early 
liquidation of the long-term asset.  Such early liquidation is costly since it only yields the 
return of s units per one unit invested at 0=t  and liquidated at 1=t  where . Let l 
denote the amount of the long-term asset liquidated early.  Using these resources, the 
bank has to pay x to each depositor claiming to be impatient and repay short-term debt 
d
Rs <
d
01 at the market interest rate of r01. Then, the resource constraint at  can be written 
as
1=t
16
slddrx dd +≤+ 120101π .     (4) 
At , the bank receives the returns from the non-liquidated part of the long-
term asset , obtaining the return R for each unit not liquidated. The liabilities of the 
bank include a payment of y units to each patient depositor and repayments of short-term 
(d
2=t
lk −
d
12) and long-term (dd02) loans plus interest:  
)()1( 02021212 lkRdrdry
dd −≤++− π .    (5) 
When , the constraints (4) and (5) correspond to the case where there are no 
runs and hence no misrepresentation of type by patient agents. This implies that the 
fraction of early withdrawals is equal to the fraction of impatient depositors. Thus, the 
bank has to give the right incentives to the patient agents in the demand deposit contract 
offered so that they want to participate and they do not want to misrepresent their type. If 
a patient depositor would claim to be impatient, she would receive x units of 
consumption at . Since she would want to consume it only at , the best she 
could do is to store it at the rate of one for one. So she could consume x units at 
0=l
1=t 2=t
2=t . 
Then, the following incentive compatibility constraint must be included in the no bank 
runs case:   
                                                 
16 Here, note the implicit assumption that there will not be any misrepresentation of type by patient 
depositors at the initial stage, so that the fraction of depositors that actually withdraws at t=1 is equal to 
the fraction of impatient agents (π). In the next stage when I allow for runs, withdrawals at t=1 may be 
larger than π. This case is analyzed in section II.5. 
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yx ≤        (6)  
Finally, the following non-negativity constraints apply: 
0,,, 120201 ≥lddd ddd  and      (7) 0,, >yxk
In summary, the representative bank chooses { }yxldddk ddd ,,,,,, 120201  in order 
to maximize (1) subject to (3)-(7) taking sandRgrrr ,,,,, 120201 π as given.  
II.2.3 The Representative International Creditor’s Problem 
One of the most distinguishing features of this chapter is that I explicitly model 
the problem of international lenders (creditors). At 0=t , each creditor decides on how 
to allocate her endowment m between short-term or long-term loans to the banks: 
mdd ss ≤+ 0201       (8) 
Also at this date, the creditor formulates a plan for ds12, taking all market interest 
rates as given. At , the representative creditor has additional endowment of n and 
receives payment of the first short-term loan plus interest as resources. She allocates her 
resources between consuming u units of the good or lending additional short-term funds 
to the domestic banks, d
1=t
s
12: 
ndrdu ss +≤+ 010112       (9) 
At , the international creditor consumes an amount of v using her 
endowment of b goods and the short-term and long-term debt repayments plus interest: 
2=t
02021212
ss drdrbv ++≤        (10) 
Finally, the following non-negativity constraints also apply: 
0,, 120201 ≥sss ddd  and      (11) 0, >vu
In summary, the representative international creditor chooses 
{ }vuddd sss ,,,, 120201  in order to maximize (2) subject to (8)-(11) taking interest rates and 
m, n, b as given. 
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II.2.4 The Parameter Space and Existence of Equilibria  
In this section I discuss the restrictions on two key parameters: s and R. These 
restrictions are needed to ensure the existence of non-trivial equilibria. Assumption 1 
ensures that equilibria with banks dominate autarky. Banks help achieve better 
allocations than autarky when there is no liquidation of the long-term asset. For there to 
be no liquidation of the long-term asset, return from such liquidation s needs to below 
some threshold. Assumption 2 gives a sufficient condition for the incentive compatibility 
constraint (6) to be satisfied in all cases. 
II.2.4.1 Assumption on s 
In order to eliminate equilibria where the role of banks is trivial, I need an upper 
bound on the possible values that s can take. In the case where there are no crises, it is 
not optimal for the bank to liquidate the long-term asset. The following assumption II.1 
is necessary to motivate equilibria with banks as opposed to autarky. If it does not hold, 
then equilibrium allocations with banks are identical to those without them. In simple 
terms, there is no welfare gain from having banks in the model. 
Assumption II.1: For zero liquidation of the long-term asset to be optimal, the 
following condition is necessary or sufficient depending on the particular case: 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
++++++< Rbmg
n
Rbgm
ns
/))(1(
,
/)1(
min βπ
β
βπ
β    (12) 
Moreover, banks may not borrow positive debt from abroad if (12) does not hold 
because they would find liquidation more profitable. 
Proof: The proofs for each case listed in section II.3 are included in Appendix A.  
The intuition is that the opportunity cost of liquidation ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
s
R  needs to be large 
enough so that individuals decide to establish a financial system that can avoid 
liquidation and provide some insurance17. Henceforth, I assume that (12) holds.  
 
                                                 
17 In this case, banks cannot provide full insurance ( yx = ) because liquidation of the long term asset is 
costly. 
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II.2.4.2 Assumption on R 
The following assumption ensures that the incentive compatibility condition is satisfied 
in all equilibria of the model. This condition is very closely related to the magnitude of 
the return on the long-term asset, R.   
Assumption II.2: A sufficient condition for the incentive compatibility (IC) 
condition, i.e. xy ≥ , to be satisfied in all sets of equilibria except one is that the return 
on the long-term asset is sufficiently large: 18 
 ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
++
−
++
−≥
))(1(
,
)1(
max
mg
bn
gm
bnR βπ
β
βπ
β      (13) 
In one set of equilibria, a sufficient condition for IC is found as βnb ≥ . 
Proof: The proofs are provided in Appendix A. 
It is not surprising that the IC condition holds if the return on long-term asset is 
above a threshold. Notice that the long-term investment matures at . This is the 
same date that the bank promises to make a payment of y units of goods to each patient 
depositor. Therefore, it is only natural to presuppose a positive relationship between R 
and the optimally chosen value of y. Henceforth, I assume that (13) holds. 
2=t
II.3 Types of Equilibria  
In this section, I present an overview of the possible types of equilibria resulting 
from the model. Section II.3.1 describes the outcomes with no bank runs and no sudden 
stops. Section 3.2 characterizes possible outcomes when I allow for the possibility of 
crises. 
II.3.1 Overview of Equilibria with No Crises 
Here I focus on the cases where crises never take place. Figure 2.1.1 describes 
the timeline of events in this three-date economy. 
                                                 
18Notice that which of the terms in parentheses becomes the lower bound for R depends on whether 
1)1( <+ βπ  or not. If  1)1( <+ βπ  ( 1)1( >+ βπ ), then the second (first) term is the lower bound for R. 
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t=0 t=1 t=2
-Depositors deposit their 
endowment g in banks. 
-Banks choose { }yxldddk ddd ,,,,,, 120201 .  
-Interna ional creditors 
choose
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FIGURE 2.1.1: TIMELINE OF EVENTS WITH NO CRISES 
 
 
All decisions by banks and international creditors regarding their choice 
variables are made at date zero. Notice that there are no unexpected events in this case. 
Thus at subsequent dates, no new decisions are made, but only date-zero decisions are 
carried out. Section II.4 presents the sets of equilibria with no crises. I find that there are 
multiple equilibria both with respect to the term structure of interest rates and the 
maturity structure of debt. In particular, there are equilibria both when the no arbitrage 
condition holds, i.e.  and when it does not hold. The equilibrium maturity 
structure of debt is closely related to the term structure of interest rates. In particular, if 
the long-term interest rate is larger (smaller) than short-term interest rates compounded 
over two periods, i.e.  (
120102 rrr =
120102 rrr > 120102 rrr < ), then (i) equilibrium debt borrowed at date 
zero is entirely long-term (short-term), (ii) the equilibrium amount of borrowed is 
uniquely determined in each case. If the no arbitrage condition holds, the maturity 
structure of debt typically cannot be uniquely determined. There is one exception to this 
12d
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pattern at one corner solution in which international creditors do not want to lend short-
term at .  0=t
II.3.2 Overview of Equilibria When Crises Are Possible 
In this section, I present an overview of equilibria allowing for the possibility of 
crises in the form of bank runs and sudden stops. Figure 2.1.2 summarizes the workings 
of the economy on an event tree. As it will be explained shortly, any crisis takes place as 
a completely unexpected, surprise event. Therefore, agents’ date zero decisions cannot 
take into account the possibility of a crisis. Agents still make their date zero decisions as 
if no crises were going to take place. Date zero allocations are identical regardless of 
whether the crises actually take place or not. I present here the case where only domestic 
depositors are hit first by the surprise event. 
First, there cannot be any crisis if there is no sunspot. If domestic depositors see a 
sunspot, they immediately check the liquidity position of the banks. If the banks are 
liquid, there is no run on the banks. The liquidity condition is based on a worst-case 
scenario in which depositors run and creditors do not lend at date one. Therefore, it is 
possible to avoid all runs (and hence all crises) if the banks are liquid. Proposition 1 
below proves this result. Henceforth I assume that domestic withdrawals have legal 
priority over international debt repayments. I also assume that long-term debt 
repayments r02d02 have priority over short-term debt repayments r12d12 at date two.  
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0=t allocations are identical to the no crises case. 
1=t arrives 
No sunspot Sunspot of domestic depositors 
No bank run. 
 plans 
are executed 
at t  and 
. 
0=t
1=
2=t
Are banks illiquid? 
Yes No 
Bank run No bank run. 
 plans 
are executed 
at t  and 
. 
0=t
1=
2=tCreditors re-optimize. 
Are banks solvent? 
Yes No 
Banks are bailed out.  Sudden Stop: Banks close. Some depositors 
may be left without consumption.  
2=t arrives. Banks repay debt to creditors. 
2=t arrives. Some depositors 
may be left without consumption.  
 
FIGURE 2.1.2: POSSIBLE EVENTS WITH POSSIBLE CRISES ORIGINATED DOMESTICALLY 
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Proposition 1: If the banks are internationally liquid, that is if 
skdrx <+ 0101        (14) 
is satisfied, then there cannot be any bank runs in equilibrium.   
Proof: Suppose that (14) holds. Suppose also that creditors do not lend at date one19. 
Suppose now that all patient depositors except one run to the banks for withdrawal. 
Given the situation, let us look at this one patient depositor’s incentives. If she runs, she 
will get x units of the good. Then she will store it for the next date and consume the 
same amount. If she does not run, by (14), the bank will not close as it will still have 
some resources left after all depositors withdraw and foreign debt is repaid at date one. 
As date two arrives, the first obligation of the bank by assumption is to pay y to our 
patient depositor. Since the incentive compatibility condition xy ≥  is always satisfied, 
our patient depositor would prefer to wait for date two. Then, this would be the 
equilibrium and no patient depositor would withdraw early. QED 
 The above proposition proves that there cannot be a crisis if the banks are liquid. 
In this case, everything goes as was planned at date zero. Creditors lend d12 amount of 
resources as was promised, banks service withdrawals and repay all debt instruments at 
dates one and two. If, at the beginning of date one, banks are illiquid, then the 
allocations satisfy 
          (15) skdrx ≥+ 0101
When (15) holds, there is a possibility that patient depositors may have a sunspot 
and run to the banks for withdrawal. When a bank run happens, I find that under some 
solvency conditions it may be in the international creditors’ interest to bail the banks out 
of the crisis20. In other circumstances, there is no way the bank could be saved. In the 
latter case, a sudden stop takes place.  
                                                 
19 The liquidity position of the bank cannot be worse than it is when creditors stop lending and depositors 
run. If, in this case I am able to show that a bank run is not possible, then the bank is in a better position in 
all other cases with positive lending. Hence a run is not possible in those other cases as well.  
20 Chang and Velasco (2000) argue that if the banks are illiquid, international creditors will never lend any 
amount at date one. In this chapter, I argue that positive lending is still possible under some conditions 
studied in section II.5 below.  
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 Once a run happens, the banks have to pay x goods instead of πx goods in 
aggregate to depositors. International creditors observe this crisis and reconsider their 
decisions about whether to lend the previously promised amount d12 goods to banks or 
not. This decision is based upon solvency position of the banks. At , after domestic 
depositors run on illiquid banks, these banks can still be solvent and thus worth bailing 
out by international creditors. If bailed out, banks survive until 
1=t
2=t  and they are able to 
repay their debts at . However, if the banks are insolvent, they are considered not 
worth of bailing out by international creditors: such banks will fail inevitably at 
2=t
1=t .  
After observing that a run has taken place, international creditors re-optimize 
according to the new circumstances. They adjust the amounts of debt they want to lend 
to the banks. In equilibrium, they lend a gross amount of z12 units at date one. This 
amount is not necessarily equal to the anticipated amount that was originally 
promised at date zero. Also, creditors may want to adjust the quantity of the long-term 
debt to a new level denoted by z
12d
02.  Lastly, the banks may liquidate part of the long-term 
asset; .  0≥l
A possible method of measuring solvency of banks is the following: Banks are 
considered insolvent when even if they were to liquidate the long-term asset completely, 
their current level of borrowing would not be sufficient to fulfill their obligations at date 
one. On the one hand, banks are insolvent when the following sufficient condition holds: 
120101 zskdrx +>+        (16) 
In section II.5, proposition 5, I prove that (16) is a sufficient condition for a sudden stop 
to take place. On the other hand, banks may be solvent when the following condition 
holds:21
  120101 zskdrx +≤+ .       (17) 
There are two possible outcomes of the creditors’ re-optimization problem. In the 
first outcome, international creditors choose 00212 == zz , deciding not to bail the banks 
out of the crisis, because the latter are insolvent. This event is called a sudden stop. By 
                                                 
21 Although (16) is sufficient for insolvency, (17) is not sufficient for solvency. It is only necessary.  
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illiquidity condition (15) and the assumption that domestic liabilities have priority over 
international, the banks must partially or fully default on short-term debt d01. If default 
on this debt instrument is full, then it must be that some depositors waiting in line do not 
have the chance to obtain any payment before banks close down22. Those depositors are 
left without consumption. This is a “very bad outcome” as the utility of those depositors 
left without consumption is infinitely negative. This implies that the domestic economy 
is worse off than it would be without any banks. This is because in the case of autarky, 
each domestic depositor is able to consume a positive amount of goods. This “very bad 
outcome” happens if creditors do not bail the banks out and the following condition 
holds: 
         (18) skx >
In section II.5.3, I analyze the cases in which a “very bad outcome” occurs. In particular, 
I compare closed and open financial systems in terms of vulnerability to a very bad 
outcome. If there is a sudden stop, banks close down at date one after liquidating the 
long-term asset completely.  
In the second outcome, creditors set and , thus bail the banks out 
of the crisis. They find it rational to do so after they re-optimize under the new 
conditions. When banks are bailed out, all domestic depositors consume the amount of 
goods originally promised to impatient depositors. Banks survive to date three and repay 
their new debt to creditors. Notice that in a bailout, banks do not have any domestic 
obligations at date three. I propose a solution to the creditors’ re-optimization problem 
and find the bank’s solvency condition in section II.5.2. 
012 >z 002 >z
 In the next section, I start describing separating equilibria where crises are never 
observed. In section II.5, I analyze equilibria allowing for the possibility of crises. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 This possibility is a result of the sequential service constraint. 
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II.4 Equilibria with No Bank Runs and No Sudden Stops 
 In this section, I describe sets of separating equilibria in which no sunspots exist 
and probability of a crisis is zero.  
II.4.1 Market Clearing Conditions 
There is a single world market for each of the three debt instruments d01, d02 and 
d12. These markets clear at 0=t when the world aggregate supply of funds equals the 
world aggregate demand for funds: 
        (19) 0101 ds dd =
         (20) 0202 ds dd =
         (21) 1212 ds dd =
These conditions determine the set of equilibrium interest rates on these debts r01, r02 and 
r12.  
II.4.2 General Equilibrium and Determinacy 
For a theorist, the best of the all possible worlds is one in which the social 
situation being analyzed can be formalized in a manner that, on the one 
hand, is very parsimonious…and on the other, manages to predict a 
unique outcome. 
–Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) 
 
Although the model presented in this chapter seems to start as a simple exercise 
and satisfies the first part of the above recommendation, its outcome is not unique. 
Depending on the borrowing and lending behavior of the banks and the international 
creditors, at least thirteen sets of equilibria arise with varying degrees of multiplicity. 
One meaningful criterion to classify those equilibria seems to be on the basis of the 
degree of determinacy. The degree of determinacy has two dimensions: price 
determinacy and quantity determinacy. 
Price determinacy can be understood by envisioning the space of admissible 
equilibrium interest rates at each set of equilibria. Starting from the more determinate to 
the less determinate, the sets of equilibria can be classified into three categories: points, 
curve segments and convex surfaces in the space of equilibrium interest rates (r01, r12, 
r02).  
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(i) A point in the space of (r01, r12, r02) represents a unique price vector. 
There exists one such equilibrium when both banks and international 
creditors are at an interior solution for all three assets. 
(ii) Sets of equilibria that admit curve segments in the interest rate space23. 
Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) describe this class of equilibria 
as locally unique or regular. Here, the relative price vector (the 
normalized interest rates vector) is unique. So I consider this class of 
equilibria to have more predictive power than the next class below. As 
Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) put it:  
“From the theoretical point of view, if uniqueness is 
not achievable, the next-best property is local 
uniqueness.” 
(iii) There are six sets of equilibria that admit convex surfaces in the space of 
interest rates. These are characterized by a multiplicity of relative price 
vectors. I call these sets of equilibria irregular24.  
The second dimension of determinacy is in terms of the equilibrium quantities of 
assets (debt) traded. In some cases, equilibrium quantities of assets traded are 
indeterminate: both banks and creditors are indifferent to a continuum of vectors of the 
amounts of the three assets  that satisfy certain conditions. This 
phenomenon is observed typically when the no arbitrage condition holds: .  
),,( 021201 ddd
120102 rrr =
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 One common property of the cases in this group is that out of five first order conditions on both 
problems, always three of them are at interior solution providing three equalities.  
24 There is at least one set of equilibria that admit volumes in the space of interest rates. However, I do not 
explore those equilibria in this chapter. 
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An alternative criterion for classifying different sets of equilibria seems to be the 
no arbitrage condition. This condition specifies the relationship between the interest 
rates on two short-term and one long-term debt instruments. Proposition 2 analyzes the 
cases where the no arbitrage condition holds, i.e. 120102 rrr = .  No arbitrage means that 
borrowing (lending) two consecutive short-term assets costs (yields) the same as 
borrowing (lending) the long-term asset from the banks’ (international creditors’) 
perspective. Proposition 3 analyzes the cases where compounded short-term interest 
rates are smaller than long-term rates, i.e. . Proposition 4 presents the cases 
where long-term borrowing is relatively cheaper, i.e. . The proofs of these 
propositions are included in Appendix A. 
120102 rrr >
021201 rrr >
II.4.2.1 Equilibria Where the No Arbitrage Condition Holds 
 This section analyzes the cases where the long-term interest rate is equal to the 
short-term interest rates compounded over the same maturity. The proofs of the 
propositions 2, 3 and 4 are included in Appendix A.2, A.3 and A.4 respectively. 
Proposition 2: When the no arbitrage condition in the international debt markets 
 holds, five sets of equilibria are observed with no liquidation and no sudden 
stops. Case 1.A is observed when both the banks and the international creditors are at 
an interior solution for all assets. Case 1.B is observed when only creditors are at an 
interior solution for all assets, but bank behavior varies. Case 1.C is observed when only 
banks are at an interior solution for all assets, but creditors are at a corner solution. 
Table 2.1 offers a summary. 
120102 rrr =
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TABLE 2.1: SETS OF EQUILIBRIA WHEN THE NO ARBITRAGE CONDITION HOLDS 
Case Interest rates Demand F.O.C. Supply F.O.C. Quantities traded 
1.A R=r01r12=r02 dd01 interior ds01 interior d01 indeterminate 
 Unique dd02 interior N/A d02 indeterminate 
  dd12 interior ds12 interior d12 indeterminate 
     
1.B.1 R > r02 =  r01r12   dd01 interior ds01 interior d01 indeterminate 
 Locally Unique dd02 right corner N/A d02 indeterminate 
  dd12 right corner ds12 interior d12 indeterminate 
     
1.B.2 R > r02 =  r01r12   dd01 right corner ds01 interior d01 indeterminate 
 Locally Unique dd02 right corner N/A d02 indeterminate 
  dd12 interior ds12 interior d12 indeterminate 
     
1.B.3 R > r02 =  r01r12   dd01 right corner ds01 interior d01 indeterminate 
 Irregular dd02 right corner N/A d02 indeterminate 
  dd12 right corner ds12 interior d12 indeterminate 
     
1.C R = r02 =  r01r12   dd01 interior ds01 = 0 d01 = 0 
 Locally Unique dd02 interior N/A d02 = m 
  dd12 interior ds12 right corner grd 0112 π=  
Note: Notice that I have only two first order conditions from the international creditors’ problem, while I 
have three first order conditions from the banks’ problem. 
 
 
 Now I characterize each case in detail. From now on, I refer to the solution to the 
creditors’ optimization problem as only the creditors’ problem and solution to the banks’ 
optimization problem as the banks’ problem. 
Case 1.A This case arises when international creditors want to lend and banks want 
to borrow finite amounts of debt in all three markets. Then there exists a set of equilibria 
with a unique price vector. In this set, the market interest rates are determinate 
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01 βπ
β , β
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bgmRr +++= ])1([12  and Rr =02 .  The quantities of 
assets traded are indeterminate, but the following relationships describe a continuum of 
equilibria. From the creditors’ problem,  and mdd =+ 0201
12
01
010112 )1(11 r
bmrndrd βββ
β
+−+−++= . From the banks’ problem, grdrd π01010112 += . 
Case 1.B Case 1.B is observed when only creditors are at an interior solution for all 
assets, but bank behavior varies. 
Case 1.B.1 This case arises when 
 (i) international creditors want to lend finite amounts of debt in all three markets, 
but  
 (ii) banks want to borrow arbitrarily large amounts of long-term debt at date zero 
and short-term debt at date one. 
Then there exists a set of locally unique equilibria in terms of prices. In this set, 
and  Rr <02
1
11
2
11
0112 2
4
)(
A
CABB
rr
−+−=      (22)  
where )( 01011 nmrrA +≡ πβ , [ ])1()1()1( 011 βπβππβπ ++++−−≡ gRRmbrnRB  
and RbC )1(1 π−−≡ . The amounts of debt traded are indeterminate, but are described by 
the following relationships. From creditors’ problem,  and mdd =+ 0201
12
01
010112 )1(11 r
bmrndrd βββ
β
+−+−++= . From banks’ problem, 
1201
1201
01010112 )1(
])([
rrR
rmrmgRrdrd πππ +−
−++=  . 
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Case 1.B.2 This case arises when 
 (i) international creditors want to lend finite amounts of debt in all three markets, 
but  
 (ii) banks want to borrow arbitrarily large amounts of both short and long-term 
debt at date zero. 
Then there exists a set of locally unique equilibria in terms of prices. In this set, 
and  Rr <02
ββπ
βπ
nmr
bmgRrr +−+
+++=
]1)1([
)1)(()(
01
0112      (23) 
The amounts of debt traded are indeterminate, but are described by the following 
relationships. From the creditors’ problem,  and mdd =+ 0201
12
01
010112 )1(11 r
bmrndrd βββ
β
+−+−++= . From the banks’ problem, 
mr
r
mgRdrd ππ 01
12
010112
)( −++=  . 
Case 1.B.3 This case arises when  
 (i) international creditors want to lend finite amounts of debt in all three markets, 
but  
 (ii) banks want to borrow arbitrarily large amounts of debt in all three markets. 
Then there exists a set of irregular equilibria. In this set, and the set of 
equilibrium interest rates lie as values between the curves described in cases 1.B.1 and 
1.B.2 that are on the surface defined by the no arbitrage condition, . The 
amounts of debt traded are indeterminate, but are described by the following 
relationships. From the creditors’ problem,  and 
Rr <02
120102 rrr =
mdd =+ 0201
12
01
010112 )1(11 r
bmrndrd βββ
β
+−+−++= . From the banks’ problem, 
mr
r
mgRdrd ππ 01
12
010112
)( −++<  and 
1201
1201
01010112 )1(
])([
rrR
rmrmgRrdrd πππ +−
−++> . 
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Case 1.C This case arises when  
 (i) international creditors do not want to lend short-term at date zero, but want to 
lend arbitrarily large amounts at date one, and 
 (ii) banks want to borrow finite amounts of debt in all three markets.  
Then there exists a set of locally unique equilibria. In this set,  and Rr =02 Rrr =1201 . 
The amounts of debt traded are determined as grdandmdd π01120201 ,0 === . 
While equilibrium interest rates are uniquely determined in case 1.A, the 
amounts of assets traded are indeterminate. There is a continuum of equilibria with 
different combinations of the vector  satisfying three relationships stated in 
the proposition. Each one of these equilibria delivers the same consumption vector for 
both domestic depositors and international creditors. The consumption levels are 
uniquely determined in terms of parameters. Consumption offered per impatient agent 
(x) depends negatively on the equilibrium interest rate at date one (r
),,( 021201 ddd
12)25. Therefore, 
effects that change the latter also change the former. First, as the fraction of impatient 
agents π rises, the equilibrium interest rate at date one rises and it is more difficult to 
borrow at this date. This makes sense because as the number of impatient agents rises, 
demand for funds dd12 increases as date one obligations of the bank are larger. 
Consequently, the impatient agents’ level of consumption decreases. Second, this 
consumption level is positively (and closely) related to the international creditor’s 
endowment (income) at date one, but negatively related to the international creditor’s 
endowment (income) at other dates. Therefore the consumption level of impatient 
depositors is sensitive to changes in income of the rest of the world. On the other hand, 
domestic consumption at date two offered by the bank’s demand deposit contract (y) 
only depends on the domestic endowment at date zero and the return on long-term 
investment. In other words, patient agents’ consumption is independent of effects 
coming from rest of the world in this case. International creditors’ date two consumption 
(v) is closely (and positively) related to the return on domestic long-term investment (R).  
                                                 
25 In case 1.A, 
12r
gRx = and gRy =  where β
βπ
n
bgmRr +++= ])1([12 . 
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FIGURE 2.2: EQUILIBRIUM INTEREST RATES FOR CASES 1.A AND 1.B 
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Figure 2.2 represents the admissible interest rates in  space for the 
cases 1.A and 1.B
),,( 021201 rrr
26. Case 1.A interest rate vector is represented by the point at the tip of 
the surface in Figure 2.2. Case 1.B interest rates are represented by the surface itself. 
Case 1.B includes the situations where the international creditors are at the interior 
solution for all three debt instruments, but the banks want to borrow large amounts of 
debt for various maturities. This behavior is consistent with the figure as all three interest 
rates in case 1.B are smaller than their counterparts in case 1.A. Similar to case 1.A, case 
1.B is also marked by the indeterminacy of the equilibrium amounts of debt traded. This 
indeterminacy seems to be the case whenever creditors are at an interior solution of their 
problem. Depending on differences in borrower behavior, there are three separate sets of 
equilibria under case 1.B.  
Case 1.B.1 is observed when banks want to borrow large amounts of long-term 
debt at date zero and short-term debt at date one. On Figure 2.2, the interest rate vectors 
corresponding to this case are represented by the smaller-r12 edge of the sheet that 
extends down from the point 1.A until the kink at 4.001 == sr . The interest rates are on a 
curve; therefore this set of equilibria is locally unique.  
Case 1.B.2 represents another set of locally unique equilibria. The interest rates 
are on the larger-r12 edge of the sheet extending down from point 1.A until the bottom of 
the sheet. Compared to 1.B.1, interest rates r12 and r02 are larger in the region 
where . However, the short-term rate rsr >01 01 could have very low values in this case.  
Case 1.B.3 interest rates are represented by the sheet’s surface except its edges. 
The interest rates are consistent with corresponding borrower behavior as the rates are 
between those of case 1.B.1 and case 1.B.2 except for the region where . sr <01
 
 
                                                 
26 The figure is drawn using the following parameter values:  
4.0,4,5.1,99.0,10,11,12,3.0 ======== sgRmnb βπ  
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Figure 2.3 illustrates the interest rates admitted by case 1.C. This case includes 
equilibria where banks (borrowers) are at the interior solution for all three assets. In this 
case, one can observe that the problem of quantity indeterminacy is solved when 
creditors choose not to lend short-term in the first date. This pins down the equilibrium 
short-term debt amount as zero and long-term debt amount as the maximum of m units. 
Compared to case 1.A, while value of the long-term rate is the same ( ) in both 
cases, the date zero short-term rate (r
Rr =02
01) is smaller in 1.C. This tilts international 
creditors’ preference toward long-term lending at date zero. As I will explain in detail in 
section II.5, the long-term maturity structure in this case seems to reduce vulnerability of 
the domestic economy to crises. This is because in this case the illiquidity condition (15) 
is unlikely to be satisfied.  
II.4.2.2 Equilibria Where the Long-term Rate Is Larger
 This section analyzes equilibria where the cost of (return on) two consecutive 
short-term loans is less than the cost of (return on) the long-term loan. Proposition 3 
describes four such sets of equilibria. 
Proposition 3: When 
(i) the no arbitrage condition in the international debt markets does not 
hold and long-term debt is more expensive, i.e.,  and 120102 rrr >
(ii) the long-term interest rate is equal to the return on the long-term 
asset, , Rr =02
international creditors do not want to lend short-term debt at date zero ( ), but 
they want to lend a finite amount of short-term debt at date one. As a result of four types 
of borrower (bank) behavior, four sets of equilibria are observed with no liquidation and 
no sudden stops. In each set, banks want to borrow a finite amount of long-term debt at 
date zero, but their behavior varies for other assets. Table 2.2 offers a summary.  
001 =sd
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TABLE 2.2: SETS OF EQUILIBRIA WHEN LONG-TERM RATES ARE LARGER 
Case Interest rates Demand F.O.C. Supply F.O.C. Quantities traded 
2.A R = r02>r01r12 dd01 right corner ds01 = 0  d01=0 
 Locally Unique dd02 interior N/A d02=m 
  dd12 interior ds12 interior 
Rbgm
gnd
/)1(12 +++= βπ
βπ  
     
2.B R = r02>r01r12 dd01 right corner ds01 = 0  d01 = 0  
 Irregular dd02 interior N/A d02=m 
  dd12 right corner ds12 interior 
12
12
12 )1( r
bmRrnd β
β
+
−−=  
     
2.C R = r02>r01r12 dd01 interior ds01 = 0  d01=0 
 Locally Unique dd02 interior N/A d02=m 
  dd12 right corner ds12 interior 
12
12
12 )1( r
bmRrnd β
β
+
−−=  
     
2.D R = r02>r01r12 dd01=0 ds01 = 0  d01=0 
 Irregular dd02 interior N/A d02=m 
  dd12 right corner ds12 interior 
12
12
12 )1( r
bmRrnd β
β
+
−−=  
 
 
 Now I characterize each case in detail.  
Case 2.A This case arises when banks want to borrow arbitrarily large amounts of 
short-term debt at date zero and a finite amount of short-term debt at date one. Then 
there exists a set of locally unique equilibria. In this set, the market interest rates are 
determined as ,Rr =02 β
βπ
n
bgmRr +++= ])1([12  and 0/)1( 01 >>+++ rRbgm
n
βπ
β . 
The maturity structure of debt is found as 
Rbgm
gndandmdd
/)1(
,0 120201 +++=== βπ
βπ . 
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Case 2.B  This case arises when banks want to borrow arbitrarily large amounts of 
short-term debt at dates zero and one. Then there exists a set of irregular equilibria. In 
this set, ,  where the latter lower bound is defined as Rr =02 )( 011212 rrr >
2
22
2
22
0112 2
4
)(
A
CABB
rr
−+−= where
])1([)1(, 012012 RgbmRrRnBnrA βπβπβπ +++−−==  and 
)()1(2 bmRRC +−−= π . Also, srRbgm
n >>+++ 01/)1( βπ
β . The maturity structure 
of debt is found as 
12
12
120201 )1(
,0
r
bmRrndandmdd β
β
+
−−=== .  
Case 2.C  This case arises when banks want to borrow a finite amount of short-term 
debt at date zero and arbitrarily large amounts of debt at date one. Then there exists a set 
of locally unique equilibria. In this set, the market interest rates are determined as 
,   and Rr =02 )( 011212 rrr = srRbgm
n >>+++ 01/)1( βπ
β . The maturity structure of 
debt is determined as 
12
12
120201 )1(
,,0
r
bmRrndmdd β
β
+
−−=== .  
Case 2.D  This case arises when banks do not want to borrow any short-term debt at 
date zero, but arbitrarily large amounts of debt at date one. Then there exists a set of 
irregular equilibria. In this set, the market interest rates are determined as a surface that 
satisfies the following: ,Rr =02 )( 011212 rrr < and Rrr <1201 . The equilibrium amounts of 
debt traded are found as 
12
12
120201 )1(
,0
r
bmRrndandmdd β
β
+
−−=== . 
I find that when the compounded short-term interest rates are smaller than the 
long-term rates, equilibrium debt contracted at date zero is exclusively long-term. In 
addition to case 2, such a long-term maturity structure was also found in case 1.C. One 
common property of both cases is that the equilibrium long-term interest rate is equal to 
the return on the long-term asset, ( Rr =02 ). Notice that R is the maximum possible value 
that this rate can possibly take. This implies that the domestic economy appears to have 
 40
a long-term maturity structure of debt only in cases which it pays a large borrowing cost. 
This is consistent with the notion that borrowing long-term is expensive for the emerging 
market economies27. On the other hand, as I will show later in section II.5, having a 
long-term maturity structure decreases the likelihood of a bank run by making banks 
“more liquid”.  Therefore, there seems to be a tradeoff between a larger cost of long-
term borrowing and a lower vulnerability to crises (runs). A similar tradeoff was 
demonstrated by Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler (2003) in the context of sovereign 
borrowing.  
Figure 2.4 illustrates the sets of equilibria for the cases 1.A, 2.A and 2.C. In case 
2.A, both r02 and r12 are uniquely determined in terms of parameters. Comparing this 
case to 1.A (a.k.a. the interior solution), one observes that r01 is not uniquely determined 
in 2.A, which it was in the interior solution. On the other hand, in the interior solution 
amounts of debt contracted could not be determined while in 2.A those are determined. 
In 2.A, banks want to borrow arbitrarily large amounts of d01, because the interest rate 
on this asset is smaller than its value in the interior solution. For the same reason, 
international creditors do not want to lend any amount of this asset. Therefore all lending 
is long-term for date zero.  
                                                 
27 Previous literature already pointed this out, but in reference to default risk. That is, there is a consensus 
that there is a larger risk premium on longer term debt (for example, see Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler 
2003). The result that I find is that one does not have to have default risk in a model to get larger 
borrowing cost for longer term debt. 
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FIGURE 2.4: EQUILIBRIUM INTEREST RATES FOR CASES 2.A AND 2.C 
 
Case 2.C implies smaller interest rates for borrowing at date one (r12) than both 
the interior solution and case 2.A. Therefore banks want to borrow arbitrarily large 
amounts of d12. International creditors exhibit the same lending behavior as in case 2.A.  
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FIGURE 2.5: EQUILIBRIUM INTEREST RATES FOR CASES 2.B AND 2.C 
 
 
FIGURE 2.6: EQUILIBRIUM INTEREST RATES FOR CASE 2.D 
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In Figure 2.5, case 2.C rates coincide with the larger-r01 (or smaller-r12) edge of 
the surface that shows case 2.B rates. That is, the latter case implies smaller short-term 
interest rates at date zero (r01). Hence in case 2.B banks want to borrow arbitrarily large 
amounts of d01, but they cannot do this because international creditors do not want to 
lend any of this asset. In summary, cases 2.B, 2.C and 2.D differ only in terms of 
borrowing behavior for this asset. In the same order, banks want to borrow less and less 
of this asset because its interest rate is rising. Figure 2.6 illustrates possible interest rates 
on a sheet for case 2.D, in which case banks’ demand for this asset is zero.  
The smaller-r01 edge of the sheet represents case 2.C rates. Note that the 
equilibrium amount of debt traded for d01 is determined by supply side as zero; hence it 
does not change across the cases 2.B, 2.C and 2.D. 
II.4.2.3 Equilibria Where the Short-term Rates Are Larger 
 This section analyzes equilibria where the compounded rate on two consecutive 
short-term loans is larger than the rate on the long-term loan. Proposition 4 describes 
five sets of equilibria under this category. 
Proposition 4: When the no arbitrage condition in the international debt markets 
does not hold and short-term rates are larger, i.e., , international creditors do 
not want to lend long-term ( ). As a result of three types of borrower and two 
types of lender behavior, six sets of equilibria are observed with no liquidation and no 
sudden stops. Table 2.3 offers a summary.  
021201 rrr >
002 =sd
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TABLE 2.3: SETS OF EQUILIBRIA WHEN SHORT-TERM RATES ARE LARGER 
Case Interest rates Demand F.O.C. Supply F.O.C. Quantities traded 
3.A.1 R=r01r12>r02 dd01 interior ds01 interior d01 = m 
 Locally Unique dd02 right corner  d02 = 0 
  dd12 interior ds12 right corner 
12
12
)(
r
gmRd π+=
     
3.A.2 R=r01r12>r02 dd01 interior ds01 right corner d01 = m 
 Locally Unique dd02 right corner  d02 = 0 
  dd12 interior ds12 interior 
Rbgm
gmnd
/)1(
)(
12 +++
+= βπ
πβ  
     
3.B.1 R > r01r12> r02 dd01 interior ds01 interior d01 = m 
 Irregular dd02 right corner  d02 = 0 
  dd12 right corner ds12 right corner 
1201
01
12 )1(
)(
rrR
gmRrd ππ
π
+−
+=
     
3.B.2 R > r01r12> r02 dd01 interior ds01 right corner d01 = m 
 Irregular dd02 right corner  d02 = 0 
  dd12 right corner ds12 interior 
1201
01
12 )1(
)(
rrR
gmRrd ππ
π
+−
+=
     
3.C.1 R > r01r12> r02 dd01 right corner ds01 interior d01 = m 
 Irregular dd02 right corner  d02 = 0 
  dd12 interior ds12 right corner 
01
12
12 )1(
)( mr
r
mgRd ππ −++=
 
     
3.C.2 R > r01r12> r02 dd01 right corner ds01 right corner d01 = m 
 Irregular dd02 right corner  d02 = 0 
  dd12 interior ds12 interior 
01
12
12 )1(
)( mr
r
mgRd ππ −++=  
 
 
Now I describe each case in detail.  
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Case 3.A  This case is observed when banks want to borrow arbitrarily large 
amounts of long-term debt at date zero but a finite amount of short-term debt at date zero 
and date one. There are two sub-cases that represent two types of creditor behavior. 
Case 3.A.1  This case arises when 
 (i) international creditors want to lend arbitrarily large amounts of debt at date 
one, but a finite amount of short-term debt in  date zero,   
 (ii) banks want to borrow arbitrarily large amounts of long-term debt at date zero 
but a finite amount of short-term debt at date zero and date one. 
Then there exists a set of locally unique equilibria. In this 
set, andRrr =1201 )(
])([
12
02 gRnr
bgmRRr πβ
π
−
++= . The amounts of debt traded are determined 
as
12
120201
)(0,
r
gmRdanddmd π+=== . 
Case 3.A.2  This case arises when 
 (i) international creditors want to lend arbitrarily large amounts of short-term 
debt at date zero, but a finite amount of debt in  date one,   
 (ii) banks want to borrow arbitrarily large amounts of long-term debt at date zero 
but a finite amount of short-term debt at date zero and date one.  
Then there exists a set of locally unique equilibria. In this set, Rr <02 , 
Rbgm
nr
/)1(01 +++= βπ
β and β
βπ
n
bgmRr +++= ])1([12 . The amounts of debt traded 
are determined as
12
120201
)(0,
r
gmRdanddmd π+=== . 
Case 3.B  This case is observed when banks want to borrow arbitrarily large 
amounts of long-term debt at date zero and short-term debt at date one, but a finite 
amount of short-term debt at date zero.  There are two sub-cases that represent two types 
of creditor behavior. 
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Case 3.B.1  This case arises when 
 (i) international creditors want to lend arbitrarily large amounts of debt at 
date one, but a finite amount of short-term debt at  date zero,   
 (ii) banks want to borrow arbitrarily large amounts of long-term debt at date 
zero and short-term debt at date one, but a finite amount of short-term debt at date zero.   
Then there exists a set of irregular equilibria. In this 
set, andRrr <1201
1
2/1
11
2
11
011212 2
)4()(
A
CABBrrr −+−=> where A1, B1 and C1 are as 
defined in (23). Also,
)]()([
])([
0101
120101
02 gmRrnmr
bgmRrrrr πφβ
φπ
+−+
++= where 1201)1( rrR ππφ +−= . 
The amounts of debt traded are determined as φ
π )(0, 01120201 gmRrdanddmd +=== . 
Case 3.B.2  This case arises when 
 (i) international creditors want to lend arbitrarily large amounts of short-
term debt at date zero, but a finite amount of debt in  date one,   
 (ii) banks want to borrow arbitrarily large amounts of long-term debt at date 
zero and short-term debt at date one, but a finite amount of short-term debt at date zero.  
Then there exists a set of irregular equilibria. In this 
set, ,Rrr <1201 Rbgm
nrs
/)1(01 +++<< βπ
β  and 
1
2/1
11
2
11
011212 2
)4()(
A
CABBrrr −+−== , 
where A1, B1 and C1 are as defined in (23). Also, 120102 rrr < . The amounts of debt traded 
are determined as φ
π )(0, 01120201 gmRrdanddmd +=== . 
Case 3.C  This case arises when banks want to borrow arbitrarily large amounts of 
long-term and short-term debt at date zero, but a finite amount of short-term debt at date 
one. There are two sub-cases that represent two types of creditor behavior. 
Case 3.C.1  This case arises when 
 (i) international creditors want to lend arbitrarily large amounts of debt at date 
one, but a finite amount of short-term debt in  date zero,   
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 (ii) banks want to borrow arbitrarily large amounts of long-term and short-term 
debt at date zero, but a finite amount of short-term debt at date one.  
Then there exists a set of irregular equilibria. In this set, Rrr <1201 , 
ββπ
βπ
nmr
bmgRrrr +−+
+++=>
]1)1([
)1)(()(
01
011212  and Rbgm
nr
/)1(
0 01 +++<< βπ
β . Also, 
)]()([
])1()([
0112
12011201
02 mgRnmrr
brmrmgRrrr +−+
+−++= ππβ
ππ . The amounts of debt traded are determined 
as 01
12
120201 )1(
)(0, mr
r
mgRdanddmd ππ −++=== . 
Case 3.C.2  This case arises when 
 (i) international creditors want to lend arbitrarily large amounts of short-term 
debt at date zero, but a finite amount of debt at  date one, 
 (ii) banks want to borrow arbitrarily large amounts of long-term and short-term 
debt at date zero, but a finite amount of short-term debt at date one.  
Then there exists a set of irregular equilibria. In this set, Rrr <1201 , 
ββπ
βπ
nmr
bmgRr +−+
+++=
]1)1([
)1)((
01
12  and Rbgm
nr
/)1(
0 01 +++<< βπ
β . Also, . The 
amounts of debt traded are determined 
as
120102 rrr <
01
12
120201 )1(
)(0, mr
r
mgRdanddmd ππ −++=== . 
I find that when the compounded short-term interest rates are larger than the 
long-term rates, equilibrium debt structure for date zero is completely short-term. I show 
in section II.5.1 that such a short-term debt maturity leaves banks more vulnerable to 
runs in case 3 than in other cases. In particular, I prove that in this case banks are always 
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 internationally illiquid, i.e. their potential liabilities exceed their potential assets at date 
one28. In other words, the model predicts that crisis episodes should be associated with 
larger short-term over long-term rates.  
Another striking finding from case 3 is that it admits interest rates that are less 
price determinate than the other cases. This pattern is evident by the fact that in cases 1 
and 2, there are one and two sets of irregular equilibria, respectively. In case 3 there are 
four such sets. The model seems to predict that situations where crises are more likely 
(banks are less liquid) should be associated with a greater indeterminacy of interest rates.  
The above phenomena are consistent with empirical observation of crisis 
episodes by Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler (2003). They studied financial crisis 
episodes using data on sovereign bond spreads at different maturities since the early 
1990s up to 2003. They estimated excess returns on emerging market bonds over risk-
less US and German bonds. They found that before or during crisis episodes, average 
debt maturity shortens. This finding coincides with my results in the following sense: I 
find that in case 3 where runs (crises) are more likely, equilibrium debt maturity is short-
term. 
In case 3, there are six different sets of equilibria. Each represents a combination 
of three types of borrower and two types of lender behavior. Now I discuss each set of 
equilibria in detail. 
                                                 
28 That is, (15) is always satisfied in case 3. A more detailed assessment of the illiquidity condition in each 
case is done in section II.5 below. 
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FIGURE 2.7: EQUILIBRIUM INTEREST RATES FOR CASE 3.A 
 
 
 Figure 2.7 illustrates the equilibrium interest rates admitted by cases 3.A.1 and 
3.A.2. These two cases represent the same borrower but different lender behavior. At 
date zero, creditors’ supply of short-term debt in the latter case is arbitrarily large while 
in the former case it is finite. At date one, creditors’ supply is arbitrarily large in the 
former case while in the latter case it is finite. These behaviors are consistent with the 
equilibrium rates as the former case admits larger rates for r12 and smaller rates for r01 
than the latter. While in both cases banks want to borrow long-term instead of short-term 
at date zero, equilibrium borrowing is short-term due to creditors’ preference for short-
term. This preference is driven by the condition . 021201 rrr >
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FIGURE 2.8: EQUILIBRIUM INTEREST RATES FOR CASE 3.B.1 
 
 
 In Figure 2.8, the sheet surface illustrates the equilibrium interest rates admitted 
by case 3.B.1. The larger-r12 edge of the surface illustrates equilibrium rates of case 
3.A.1. Compared to case 3.A, banks want to borrow a lot more at date one in case 3.B.1. 
This borrowing behavior is consistent with interest rates as the latter case implies smaller 
interest rates (r12) in this date. The lending behavior is the same in both cases. 
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FIGURE 2.9: EQUILIBRIUM INTEREST RATES FOR CASE 3.B.2 
 
 
 The sheet in Figure 2.9 illustrates market interest rates for case 3.B.2. The top 
edge of this surface coincides with the smaller-r12 edge of the surface illustrated on 
Figure 2.8. This case represents the same borrower but different lender behavior 
compared to case 3.B.1. While in 3.B.1 lenders want to lend arbitrarily large amounts of 
debt at date one, in 3.B.2 their supply is finite. This is because (for a given r01) interest 
rate at date one (r12) is always smaller in the latter case. Moreover, the same rate is again 
smaller than that in case 3.A where banks’ demand at date one is finite. As a result, 
similar to 3.B.1, in 3.B.2 banks have arbitrarily large demand for borrowing at date one.  
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FIGURE 2.10: EQUILIBRIUM INTEREST RATES FOR CASE 3.C.1 
 
 
 The sheet in Figure 2.10 illustrates equilibrium market interest rates for the case 
3.C.1. For  (  in the figure), the larger-rsr >01 4.0=s 12 edge coincides with the rates of 
case 3.A.1. Compared to case 3.A, here in 3.C banks want to borrow arbitrarily large 
amounts of short-term debt at date zero (d01). Therefore interest rate on this asset is 
smaller in case 3.C29.  
                                                 
29 The comparison is strictly correct for all equilibria in cases 3.A.2 and 3.C.2. For 3.A.1 and 3.C.1, r01 is 
always smaller in the latter case for a given value of r12.  
 53
 
FIGURE 2.11: EQUILIBRIUM INTEREST RATES FOR CASE 3.C.2 
 
 
 Figure 2.11 shows the set of interest rates for case 3.C.2. The top edge of this 
sheet coincides with the smaller-r12 edge of the sheet on Figure 2.10. That is, for a given 
value of r01, case 3.C.2 always implies a smaller r12 than case 3.C.1. This is due to the 
fact that international creditors want to lend arbitrarily large amounts of d12 in the latter 
case but a finite amount in the former case. On the other hand, for a given value of r12, 
3.C.2 implies a larger r01 because creditors want to lend arbitrarily large amounts of d01. 
Their supply of this asset is finite in 3.C.1.  
 In section II.5 below, I allow for the possibility of crises in the form of bank runs. 
Then, I find the conditions under which a sudden stop may follow a bank run or not.   
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II.5 Equilibria with Runs and/or Sudden Stops 
In the previous section I have assumed runs and hence financial crises are not 
probable and all agents believe that. In this section I allow for crises to take place. First, 
I identify the conditions of the environment under which banks are more vulnerable to 
runs. Second, assuming a bank run has taken place, I analyze possible equilibria. I am 
particularly interested in the insolvency conditions under which international creditors 
stop lending or otherwise bail the banks out.  
II.5.1 System Liquidity and Vulnerability to Runs 
…it is a familiar point in the academic literature that Hong Kong-type 
speculative plays can work only if the economy is vulnerable to self-
fulfilling crisis in the first place... 
–Paul Krugman (1999) 
 
  In section II.3, proposition 1 has shown that for any crisis to happen, banks must 
be illiquid. That is, (15) must hold. In the following, I analyze the implications of this 
condition for each case that was found in the previous section. The objective is to 
understand in which situations banks are more vulnerable to a run. Table 2.4 summarizes 
the implications of (15) for each case. In what follows, I evaluate (15) at each 
equilibrium.  
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TABLE 2.4: BANK’S VULNERABILITY TO RUNS 
Case Interest Rates Amounts of Debt Traded Illiquid Banks 
If 
1.A Rrrr == 021201 Indeterminate 
1.B.1 Rrrr <= 021201
 
Indeterminate 
1.B.2 Rrrr <= 021201
 
Indeterminate 
1.B.3 Rrrr <= 021201
 
Indeterminate 
If ss ≤ , all 
equilibria 
illiquid30.If 
),( sss ∈ then 
depends on the 
value of d01 or 
d02. 
1.C Rrrr == 021201
 
grdmdd π01120201 ,,0 ===  All equilibria 
liquid if 
),( sss ∈ . 
2.A Rrrr =< 021201
 Rbgm
gndmdd
/)1(
,,0 120201 +++=== βπ
βπ
 
Illiquid if and 
only if ss ≤  
2.B,C,D Rrrr =< 021201
 12
12
120201 )1(
,,0
r
bmRrndmdd β
β
+
−−===  More liquid 
than case 2.A. 
3.A.1,2 
021201 rrrR >=
 12
120201
)(,0,
r
gmRddmd π+===  
3.B.1,2 
021201 rrrR >>  
φ
π )(
,0, 01120201
gmRr
ddmd
+===  
3.C.1,2 
021201 rrrR >>  
01
12
120201 )1(
)(,0, mr
r
mgRddmd ππ −++===
 
 
 
All equilibria 
illiquid. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 
)(]/)1([ mg
g
Rbgm
ns ++++= βπ
β , 
Rbgm
ns
/)1( +++= βπ
β . 
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II.5.1.1 Cases Where the No Arbitrage Condition Holds ( 120102 rrr = ) 
Case 1.A Banks are illiquid if and only if31
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+≤
01
02 1)( r
smgd         (24) 
where 
Rbmg
nr
/)1(01 +++= βπ
β . To give an idea, for parameter values that I have used 
so far, banks are illiquid if 3.5102 ≤d or 6.4801 ≥d 32. I have found in section II.4 that in 
case 1.A, the equilibrium amounts of debt traded could not be determined, i.e. 
. Condition (24) implies that if the banks’ long-term borrowing is below a 
threshold, then banks are vulnerable to runs. This result supports the conventional 
argument suggested in the literature that shortening of debt maturity increases 
vulnerability to financial crises
),0(02 md ∈
33.  
A second implication is that as the liquidation value of the long-term asset (s) 
gets smaller especially relative to the long-term return from investment (R), banks 
become more vulnerable. For example, if 
)(]/)1([ mg
g
Rbgm
nss ++++=≤ βπ
β , then 
banks are always illiquid regardless of the maturity structure of debt. If ),( sss ∈ , then 
debt maturity matters34.  
A third result is that as the fraction of impatient agents (π) increases, banks 
become less vulnerable.  At first, this sounds counter-intuitive. However, this is expected 
because the extra amount that banks need to generate in case of a run by patient 
depositors is equal to x)1( π− . As the fraction of impatient agents increases, this amount 
gets smaller. To understand this, I can think of the extreme case of 1=π , i.e. all 
                                                 
31 Or equivalently, using , banks are illiquid if and only if mdd =+ 0201 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+−≥
01
01 1)( r
smgmd . 
32 For parameter values, see footnote 18. 
33 Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler (2003) and Cole and Kehoe (1998) among others showed this result 
in the context of sovereign debt. Chang and Velasco (2000) assume away the choice of maturity structure 
of debt when they allow for crises. In particular, they assume 001 =d  when crises are possible.
34 Where 
]/)1([ Rbgm
ns +++= βπ
β  was defined in assumption 1 in section II.2. 
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depositors are impatient. Then, there are no patient agents and hence no vulnerability to 
a run.   
Lastly, all else equal, a larger return from long-term investment (R) increases 
banks’ vulnerability. This is because a larger return increases payments promised to 
impatient agents in the original plan, i.e. x goes up. This increases banks’ potential 
liabilities at date one (which is the left hand side of (15)). However, banks’ potential 
assets (sk) do not change. Therefore, the financial system becomes more vulnerable to 
runs. This perfectly fits the story of the Asian crisis of 1997-98. The high (possibly 
perceived) rates of return on investment in these economies may have contributed to the 
severity of shock once confidence collapses. 
Case 1.B.1 The reader should recall from section II.4 that in cases 1.B.1, 1.B.2 and 
1.B.3 amounts of borrowing could not be determined. For ss < , banks are always 
illiquid regardless of debt maturity. For ),( sss ∈  and a given configuration of 
parameters35, Figure 2.12 shows the illiquid and liquid regions in the space of (r01, d01). 
The graph plots the threshold amount of short-term borrowing above (below) which the 
banks become illiquid (liquid).  
 In this case, similar patterns are observed in terms of vulnerability. First, a 
shorter debt maturity implies higher vulnerability. Second, a smaller (larger) liquidation 
value (s) shifts the threshold curve downwards (upwards), hence makes banks more 
(less) vulnerable.  
                                                 
35 Parameter values are given in footnote 22 on page 30. 
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FIGURE 2.12: ILLIQUIDITY THRESHOLD FOR CASE 1.B.1 
 
 
Case 1.B.2 Here, again for ss < , banks are always illiquid regardless of debt 
maturity. For ),( sss ∈ , Figure 2.13 plots the threshold amount of short-term debt above 
which banks become illiquid. 
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FIGURE 2.13: ILLIQUIDITY THRESHOLD FOR CASE 1.B.2 
 
 
Case 1.B.3 Similar to previous cases, in this case for ss < , banks are always illiquid 
regardless of debt maturity. For ),( sss ∈ , debt maturity determines illiquidity: a shorter 
debt maturity is more vulnerable and vice versa. Figure 2.14 plots the illiquidity 
threshold surface for combinations of possible interest rates (r01, r12) in the case 
when ),( sss ∈ . If short-term borrowing is above this surface, banks become illiquid. The 
figure reveals that as short-term interest rates rise, banks become less vulnerable.  Casual 
observation of the simulations for cases 1.B.1, 1.B.2 and 1.B.3 seems to indicate a 
tradeoff between smaller interest rates and more vulnerability to runs. That is, the 
vulnerability seems to decrease as interest rates rise and vice versa. 
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FIGURE 2.14: ILLIQUIDITY THRESHOLD FOR CASE 1.B.3 
 
 
Case 1.C Banks are illiquid if 
g
mgsr )(01
+≥   . Notice that this condition does not 
depend on debt maturity since the latter is uniquely determined in this 
case: mdd == 0201 ,0 . This condition is unlikely to be satisfied, especially if the 
domestic economy is relatively small in size compared to the rest of the world. Since r01 
is bounded from above, it is easy to check that banks are always liquid (equivalently, 
allocations are run-proof) if ss > . That is, crises are possible in this case only if ss ≤ , 
while they were possible for ),0( ss ∈  in previous cases. The less vulnerable 
environment brought about by this case is due to the equilibrium long-term maturity 
structure. Once more, there is a clear case for lengthening debt maturity of the financial 
system.  
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II.5.1.2 Cases Where Long-term Debt Is More Expensive ( ) 120102 rrr >
Case 2.A Banks are illiquid if and only if ss ≤ . This implies banks are in a safer 
liquidity position compared to 1.A and 1.B. Once more, this is due to the long-term 
maturity structure in this case: mdd == 0201 ,0 . 
Cases 2.B, 2.C and 2.D In these cases, banks are illiquid if and only if 
0)]1()([12 ≥−−++−= bmRmgsnrIB βπβ      (25) 
The above implies that for
))(1( mg
ns ++≥ βπ
β  , banks are always liquid. 
For
))(1( mg
ns ++< βπ
β , I find that in cases 2.B, 2.C and 2.D banks are less vulnerable 
(less likely to be illiquid) than in case 2.A36.  
In summary, case 2 allocations are less vulnerable to a crisis than cases 1.A and 
1.B. This is due to the long-term debt maturity structure in case 2:  mdd == 0201 ,0 .
II.5.1.3 Cases Where Short-term Debt Is More Expensive ( ) 120102 rrr <
Banks are illiquid for all equilibria in case 3 where short-term rates are larger 
than long-term rates37. This is a strong result and it is due to the fact that banks have a 
very short-term debt maturity: 0, 0201 == dmd . The financial system is very fragile here 
since: 
(i) the amount of debt that needs to be rolled over at date one is huge, 
                                                 
36 The interest rate r12 is not unique in these cases, but it has parametric boundaries, ),( 121212 rrr ∈  where 
β
βπ
n
gmRbr ])1([12
+++= and
s
sss
A
CABB
r
,2
2/1
2,2
2
,2,2
12 2
)4( −+−= where 
)()1(],)1([)1(, 2,2,2 bmRRCRgbmRsRnBnsA ss +−−=+++−−== πβπβπβπ  is (26) evaluated at sr =01 . 
Notice that for
))(1( mg
ns ++< βπ
β , IB increases in r12. 
Then, ),( IBIBIB ∈ where )( 12rIBIB = and )( 12rIBIB = . This means (27) is most likely to hold when 1212 rr =  
. This happens in case 2.A. In cases 2.B, 2.C and 2.D, 1212 rr < , which means IB takes smaller values, i.e. 
banks are more liquid and less vulnerable.  
37 See Appendix A.5 for proofs. 
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(ii) costs of rolling over debt is high since short-term interest rates are larger 
than long-term rates. 
II.5.1.4 Summary of Vulnerability to Bank Runs 
The first implication of the analysis is that debt maturity is an important factor in 
determining vulnerability to bank runs. Case 3 represents the most vulnerable case as the 
debt is short-term in equilibrium. Then the next most vulnerable case is case 1 where 
debt maturity is indeterminate (except in case 1.C) and the no arbitrage condition holds. 
Unlike in case 3, vulnerability depends also on the particular parameter configuration in 
case 1. Case 2 is ranked as the least vulnerable case as a whole (except in case 1.C).  
The second implication is that among other parameters, liquidation value of the 
long-term asset, s, is an important one in determining vulnerability of a financial system. 
A smaller value of this parameter relative to some functions of the other parameters of 
the environment implies a larger likelihood of a run. In particular, liquidity seems to be 
related to two parametric thresholds for s: 
)(]/)1([ mg
g
Rbgm
ns ++++= βπ
β  
and
]/)1([ Rbgm
ns +++= βπ
β 38. In cases 1 and 2 where illiquidity depends on the value 
of this parameter39, it appears that the size of the domestic economy relative to the rest of 
the world ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+ mg
g  also matter. If the domestic economy is relatively small, the interval 
),( ss  widens. This decreases the likelihood of a run by contracting the parameter space 
in which banks are illiquid. On the other hand, if the size of the domestic economy is 
larger, its financial sector is more vulnerable. This result makes sense because if the 
domestic economy is larger compared to the rest of the world, then in case of a liquidity 
crunch it needs a larger fraction of the world liquidity to pay its liabilities. This implies, 
for example, a financial crisis in Russia is more likely than a financial crisis in Thailand 
or Hong Kong, all else equal. 
                                                 
38 Notice that by assumption 1, ss < throughout this chapter.   
39 In case 3 all equilibria are illiquid regardless of the parameter values. 
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I also find that a larger return on domestic long-term investment (R) increases 
banks’ vulnerability to bank runs. This is because a larger return increases payments 
promised to impatient agents in the original plan, i.e. x goes up. This increases banks’ 
potential liabilities at date one (which is the left hand side of (15)). However, banks’ 
potential assets (sk) do not change. Then the ratio ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
s
R  appears to be a good indicator of 
a financial system’s vulnerability to bank runs. When this ratio is large, a financial 
system is more vulnerable to liquidity problems. 
In the next section, I look at the cases where bank runs occur. Under these 
conditions, I look for the conditions under which international creditors are willing to 
bail the banks out.  
II.5.2 When Do International Creditors Stop Lending to Domestic Banks? 
In this section, I start by assuming that at date one: 
(i) domestic depositors see a sunspot,  
(ii) banks are illiquid, therefore system-wide bank runs take place in the 
domestic economy.  
Under such circumstances, would the international creditors ever be willing to 
optimally bail the banks out? What would be the creditors’ optimal response to a 
domestic bank run? Chang and Velasco (2000) argue that rational creditors would never 
lend to the banks when there is a run. However, in their model, creditors’ choice is not 
explicitly considered. In this chapter, I will show that there are circumstances under 
which creditors find it optimal to bail the banks out. If the creditors find the banks 
insolvent, a sudden stop takes place and gross capital inflows are zero. 
II.5.2.1 The Creditors’ Re-optimization Problem 
For simplicity, I assume that the actual interest rates after a bank run are equal to 
the anticipated rates before it. I admit that this assumption is an abstraction from reality. 
However, as I show below, this simplification proves to be helpful in tractability and still 
allows for valuable insights. I also assume that during a crisis, creditors and banks 
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renegotiate the quantities of debt instruments d12 and d02. The third debt instrument 
amount d01 is given to the re-optimization problem.  
When creditors observe the bank runs in the domestic economy at date one, they 
reconsider some of their date zero decisions. In particular, they choose the amount of 
gross new lending they want to make at date one under the new circumstances. This 
amount is denoted by  and is not necessarily equal to the previously promised amount 
d
12z
12. In addition, I allow creditors to renegotiate the amount of long-term debt that was 
contracted at date zero.  One reason for such a renegotiation could be the following. 
Notice that in the case of a run, if the banks survive to date two, they no longer have any 
obligation to depositors. Creditors are the only claimants of the remaining bank assets at 
this date. Therefore, bailout may be rational for creditors if they could increase the value 
of the long-term debt. This would be expected especially if the return from long-term 
investment R is large. Given that the interest rates are assumed to be constant, this means 
creditors would choose a large amount of the long-term debt. Table 2.5 introduces the 
new variables: 
 
 
TABLE 2.5: CREDITOR RE-OPTIMIZATION 
 No Crisis-Anticipated Crisis-Actual 
Gross New Lending at 1=t : 12d  12z  
Long-term Debt: 
02d  02z  
 
 
Notice that the domestic banks cannot re-optimize when a run hits. All depositors 
consume x that was originally promised to impatient depositors. Banks’ borrowing 
demand is perfectly elastic; they are willing to borrow any amounts of  and  that 
are supplied.  Therefore, it is only the solution of the representative international 
creditor’s problem that determines whether a sudden stop or a bailout is going to take 
place.  
12z 02z
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The representative creditor’s new budget constraint at date one becomes: 
010112 drnzu +≤+        (26) 
Her budget constraint at date two is expressed as: 
02021212 zrzrbv ++≤        (27) 
There is a possibility of a bailout only if the banks are going to be able to meet 
their obligations. Otherwise, creditors will not lend any money that the banks will not be 
able to repay. Then, the following conditions must be satisfied in any bailout 
equilibrium: 
         (28) slzdrx +≤+ 120101
)(02021212 lkRzrzr −≤+        (29) 
The first condition states that banks are able to meet payment obligations to their 
depositors at date one. The second condition ensures that the banks are able to repay 
their debt to creditors at date two.  
 Finally, the following non-negativity constraints need to be satisfied: 
0,,,, 0212 ≥lzzvu        (30) 
The representative creditor chooses in order to maximize (2) subject to 
(26)-(30) taking  as given.  
},,,,{ 0212 lzzvu
},,,,,,,,,{ 12020101 kRsbnxrrrd
At the interior solution of the creditors’ re-optimization problem, first order 
conditions yield the following: 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−+++= R
bksnxdrz ββ )1(
1
010112      (31) 
( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ++−+= R
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s
l ββ )1(
1       (32) 
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⎤⎢⎣
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⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
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s
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r
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r
rrk
r
Rz 121212
02
01
02
1201
02
02 1
1 βββ  (33) 
Also, notice that a bailout or a sudden stop can only happen if there is a bank run 
in the first place. Then, for a bailout or a sudden stop equilibrium to occur, banks must 
be illiquid. The latter is captured by condition (15). Then, there is a lower bound on z12 
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and an upper bound on z02. Plugging (15) in (31) and (33), I get (34) and (35) 
respectively: 
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II.5.2.2 The Insolvency Condition 
 In this section, I investigate insolvency conditions under which international 
creditors decide whether to lend to domestic banks at 1=t  or not. Proposition 5 proves 
that (16) is a sufficient condition for insolvency. Under this condition, a sudden stop 
takes place and banks fail at 1=t . Proposition 6 derives the necessary and sufficient 
insolvency condition from the creditors’ re-optimization problem. 
Proposition 5: If  
(i) a bank run has happened, and 
(ii) the  sufficient insolvency condition (16) holds,  
Then,  in equilibrium. 00212 == zz
Proof: Assume (16) holds. Let us consider the incentives of an individual 
creditor. Since each creditor is small, she takes the above state of the bank as given. She 
knows she cannot change it with her lending. At this point, it is obvious to this creditor 
that the bank will default completely on both z02 and z12. This is because it cannot even 
fulfill its date one obligations after they liquidate everything. There is no reason she 
could be lending any amount that is not going to be repaid. Then, she sets 00212 == zz . 
Then, all creditors set 00212 == zz  and this is the equilibrium. QED. 
Alternatively, one can use the first order conditions of the creditors’ re-
optimization problem to find an insolvency condition. In this way, I can link the 
insolvency condition to the fundamentals. Proposition 6 below derives the necessary and 
sufficient insolvency condition under which creditors’ optimal response to a bank run is 
a sudden stop.   
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Proposition 6: Assume that bank runs are observed in the domestic economy and 
(15) holds. Creditors do not bail the banks out and a sudden stop is observed if and only 
if 
( ) 01010101
11
drndrxsk
s
Rbs
R
+<−−+
β .     (36) 
Proof: Sufficiency: If the international creditors do not want to lend at all at date one 
(a corner solution), the derivative of the Lagrangian of the creditors’ re-optimization 
problem with respect to this variable is strictly negative. This implies: 
( ) 010112010112
11
drzndrxskz
s
Rbs
R
+−<−−++
β     (37) 
Also, the non-negativity constraint for z12 binds: 012 =z  optimally. Plugging these 
conditions into (37) yields (36).  
 Necessity: On the other hand, if (37) does not hold, then it must be that creditors 
are willing (or indifferent in case of equality) to increase 2=t  and decrease 1=t  
consumption. This is possible only by increasing the value of z12 so that . Then, a 
sudden stop is not observed when (36) does not hold. QED. 
012 >z
 In a sudden stop, the banks are not able to fully repay the loan with 
amount . The actual amount of payment is equal to what is left of the complete 
liquidation of the long-term asset. If nothing is left after the banks pay all its depositors 
(i.e. if ), then banks pay nothing to the creditors. Combining the two 
possibilities, in a sudden stop, gross outflows of capital from domestic economy is equal 
to . Also, notice that date two consumption of the creditors in a sudden 
stop is equal to their endowment b at this date. 
0101dr
0<− xsk
{ xsk −,0max }
 I find that creditors are not willing to bail the banks out and a sudden stop occurs 
if their marginal utility at  exceeds their (weighted) marginal utility at . Notice 
that the right hand side of (37) is the marginal utility of 
1=t 2=t
1=t  consumption of the 
creditor. The left hand side expresses the marginal utility of 2=t  consumption of the 
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creditor weighted by two factors. The first factor is the discount rate ( )β . If the creditor 
sharply discounts date two consumption, a sudden stop is more likely because the 
creditor is too impatient to give up 1=t  consumption and wait for  return. The 
second factor is the ratio of  and 
2=t
1=t 2=t yields from long term investment ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
s
R . If the 
return from allowing the bank to keep its investment until date two (and get R) instead of 
forcing the bank to liquidate early (and get s) is large enough, then a sudden stop is less 
likely. This same factor also appears in the denominator of the marginal utility of 2=t  
consumption. Since (15) holds, a larger factor of ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
s
R  implies a smaller denominator 
and a larger marginal utility of 2=t  consumption. Therefore, sudden stops are less 
likely. 
 Intuitively, if the creditor’s 1=t  endowment (n) is small, then a sudden stop is 
more likely because creditors have scarce resources and they are reluctant to lend at this 
date. A larger  endowment (b) on the other hand makes a sudden stop more likely 
as creditors do not need to save for date two, they already have enough to consume. 
2=t
 One important insight I gain from the above analysis is that insolvency of the 
domestic financial system is not only determined by the fundamentals of the domestic 
economy, but also by the fundamentals of the rest of the world. Taking the behavior of 
international creditors seriously changes the way we understand sudden stops. I find that 
preferences and endowments of the international creditors are of utmost relevance to 
whether a sudden stop takes place or not. 
 Below, as an example, I show the existence of a bailout equilibrium for the case 
of 1.A before the bank run. For other cases, solutions are available upon request from the 
author. 
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II.5.2.3 Bailout Equilibrium at the Interior Solution 
 In this section, I assume that a bank run is precipitated when the economy is at 
case 1.A of the general equilibrium problem in section II.4. Proposition 7 below shows 
the existence of an equilibrium where creditors find it optimal to bail the banks out.  
Proposition 7: Assume that bank runs occur in the domestic economy at the 
equilibrium of case 1.A. If the condition 
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β  is satisfied, there exists an 
equilibrium where creditors bail the banks out. At this 
equilibrium, ⎭⎬
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Proof: From case 1.A in section II.4, plug in 01grx = , Rbgm
nr
/)1(01 +++= βπ
β and 
into (31)-(33). The non-negativity constraint  impliesRrrr == 120102 0≥l ss ≥ . The 
other non-negativity constraints  do not bind. QED. 0,,, 0212 ≥zzvu
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FIGURE 2.15: SIMULATION RESULTS OF BAILOUT EQUILIBRIUM 
 
 
 Figure 2.15 shows simulation results for ),( sss ∈ 40. I find that if there is a 
bailout, actual net lending during a crisis 010112 drz −  is always larger than the anticipated 
net lending . This is an expected result because in the case of a crisis, banks 
have to pay x in the aggregate instead of the anticipated smaller amount 
of
010112 drd −
010112 drdx −=π . The banks must raise the unanticipated extra liquidity x)1( π−  via a 
combination of additional borrowing and liquidation. The liquidation value parameter 
determines how much of the either source is optimally used. This means that in any 
bailout equilibrium, creditors must extend unanticipated funds over and above what was 
originally planned. Why would the creditors do such a thing, especially considering the 
assumption that interest rates cannot be bid upward during the crisis? They do this 
                                                 
40 I remind the reader that ss < throughout the chapter by assumption 1. Also, it is easy to show that ss <  
always holds. 
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because they have the opportunity to boost their consumption at the last date. Their 
outside option is a sudden stop where banks close down and the representative creditor’s 
consumption in the last date is equal to her endowment b. Her choice of a bailout or not 
depends on the tradeoff between a smaller consumption at date one and a larger 
consumption at date two. Table 2.6 compares her consumption vectors for each 
possibility: 
 
 
TABLE 2.6: CREDITOR’S CHOICE OF BAILOUT OR SUDDEN STOP 
  u v 
No Crisis 
120101 ddrn −+  02021212 drdrb ++  
Bailout 
120101 zdrn −+  02021212 zrzrb ++  
Sudden Stop (No Bailout) },0max{ xskn −+  b  
Note: Recall that u and v represent the amounts of the good that an investor consumes at date one and two 
respectively. 
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FIGURE 2.16: TOTAL INDEBTEDNESS IN NO CRISIS AND BAILOUT CASES 
 
 
Figure 2.16 compares total indebtedness in no crisis and bailout cases. These are 
and  respectively. The total value of debt that creditors will 
accept for a bailout can be quite large, especially if the liquidation value is small. It is 
evident from the figure that a bailout could impose a heavy debt burden on the domestic 
economy. Here, there can be some confusion about how the banks are able to repay such 
a large amount of debt, given that their total resources are smaller in a bailout case than 
the no crisis case: for . However, it should be recalled that the bank 
has no domestic liabilities at the last date in the case of a run: 
02021212 drdr + 02021212 zrzr +
RklkR ≤− )( 0≥l
)(02021212 lkRzrzr −=+ . 
This is in contrast with the no crisis case in section II.4 where the bank has to make 
payments of y to each patient depositor: yRkdrdr )1(02021212 π−−=+ . 
II.5.3 A Comparison of Closed and Open Financial Systems 
When I compare my results to those of the closed economy applications of the 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) setup, I understand that we can gain important insights. In 
particular, the model helps us understand the implications of allowing a financial system 
to borrow funds from a free global capital market. In this section, an “open” financial 
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system refers to the banks’ ability to borrow funds from the rest of the world. In closed 
economy versions41, two properties are observed:  
Property 1: Whenever banks play a welfare improving role, they are always illiquid and 
vulnerable to a self-fulfilling run (Wallace 1996).  
Property 2: Whenever such a run happens, some depositors are always left without 
consumption. I call this a “very bad outcome” in the sense that depositors’ welfare is 
even smaller than it would be without any banks (autarky). The possibility of a very bad 
outcome is mentioned in the original Diamond and Dybvig (1983) paper. Therefore, in 
closed economy models, the condition that determines whether a run will occur or not 
and the condition that determines whether a very bad outcome will occur or not are one 
and the same.  
The first advantage of a liberalized financial system is regarding the illiquidity 
condition (15). In my model, equilibria with banks dominate autarky if Assumption 1 
holds. However, in contrast to closed economy models’ first property, the same 
assumption does not always imply illiquidity of banks. In particular, in cases 1 and 2, 
illiquidity requires a stronger condition than Assumption 1. This means that with an 
open financial system, it is possible to avoid illiquidity while still benefiting from 
welfare advantages of a financial equilibrium over autarky.   
The second advantage of a liberalized financial system appears after a bank run.  
In my open economy model, when there is an economy-wide run on the banks and 
creditors stop lending, there may be cases in which some depositors are left without 
consumption. In this chapter, such an outcome is observed when (18) and (36) hold at 
the same time. Condition indicates that the bank cannot fulfill its obligations to some 
depositors who are left without consumption. It applies when there is a bank run and a 
sudden stop. For a sudden stop to occur, the insolvency condition (36) must hold. 
Therefore, for a very bad outcome to occur, both conditions must hold. Notice that 
satisfaction of both of the conditions is much less likely than satisfaction of the 
illiquidity condition (15). This means that vulnerability to a bank run does not always 
                                                 
41 Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Wallace (1996), Cooper and Ross (1998) and Ennis and Keister (2004) 
among others. 
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imply vulnerability to a very bad outcome in a liberalized financial system. This is in 
contrast with the second property of closed economy models wherein a bank run 
automatically leads to a very bad outcome which yields welfare levels lower than 
autarky.  
The above comparison of results suggests that a liberalized financial system has 
several desirable properties over a closed one. Access to global capital markets seem to 
serve like a cushion against bank runs or very bad outcomes.  
II.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I construct a model of a large open economy where foreign debt 
with different maturities is available. In the model, financial crises in the form of bank 
runs and/or sudden stops can arise endogenously. I take a world general equilibrium 
approach where the behavior of international creditors is modeled explicitly. This 
approach seems to deliver important insights into understanding the relationship between 
financial crises, foreign debt maturity and the term structure of interest rates on foreign 
debt.  
 There are two opposing viewpoints in the literature on financial crises. One view 
is that fundamentals of an economy play an important role in precipitating a crisis. 
Especially after the Asian crisis of 1997-98, this view lost some ground in academic 
circles. Five Asian economies seemed to have sound policies and macroeconomic 
indicators before the crisis. In order to explain what went wrong, among other things, 
self-fulfilling nature of the confidence crisis was emphasized in the literature. Even if the 
economy has sound macroeconomic policies and a sustainable debt structure ex ante, a 
confidence crisis can easily cause large liquidation and welfare losses.  
 This chapter has some support for both views. Fundamentals before the crisis 
determines whether the financial system is liquid or not. System liquidity depends on 
two factors. First, it depends on the maturity structure of debt that the banks take on. A 
shorter debt maturity increases illiquidity. Second, it depends on the nature of the 
investment technology in the domestic economy. A larger cost of liquidating the long-
term asset increases system illiquidity. Degree of illiquidity, in turn, determines the 
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degree of risk of a domestic bank run; a crisis is more likely if banks are illiquid. In this 
sense, the model supports the “fundamentalist” view. However, I find that illiquidity is 
not a sufficient condition for a crisis (bank run) to take place. Given illiquid banks, a 
confidence crisis or a sunspot completely unrelated to the fundamentals can only 
convince the domestic depositors to run on the banks. Therefore, the self-fulfilling 
element is essential to how a crisis takes place. In this sense, the model supports the 
“self-fulfilling” view. 
 One of the important contributions of this chapter is that it is a first step in 
designing a framework that is rich enough to allow for both domestic and foreign 
sources of adverse expectations about a financial system. I have studied the case of 
sunspots of domestic depositors as the original source of a crisis. An important and 
natural extension of this chapter is to study sunspots of international creditors as the 
original source. Also, an important question is whether I can design a policy that selects 
“healthy” equilibria from among the equilibria that I have discovered in this chapter. 
 In chapter III below, I study financial fragility of a small open economy using a 
monetary model. The objective is to investigate the merits of alternative monetary 
policies with respect to the risk of a financial and a currency crisis. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
FINANCIAL FRAGILITY AND THE CHOICE OF MONETARY POLICY 
 
III.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I investigate the merits of alternative monetary policies with 
respect to financial fragility and currency crises. I study a small open economy and 
explicitly model a financial system in which banks arise to provide liquidity. I present a 
variation of an open economy version of the Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) illiquid 
investment technology when modeling my financial system. In particular, I study an 
overlapping-generations-model with an infinite sequence of two-period lived 
generations. As stated by Schreft and Smith (1997), previous neoclassical models that 
study explicit financial markets have mostly been real economies. In contrast, I study a 
monetary economy in this chapter; I take seriously the definition of fiat money as an 
object without any intrinsic value. I consider the presence of two fiat currencies 
(domestic and foreign) that can circulate simultaneously in my general equilibrium 
framework. In particular, I carefully build the environment such that money is not 
treated as a consumption good that generates utility42 or an investment good that 
generates output.  
I motivate the demand for two intrinsically useless currencies by the spatial 
separation and limited communication of agents. The latter method has been extensively 
used by Townsend (1980) and others to explain the existence of a monetary equilibrium 
in closed economies. In this chapter, the domestic economy consists of two symmetric 
islands. At the end of every period, a fraction of young agents are required to move to a 
location where only currency (domestic or foreign) is accepted as a means of payment. 
In addition, there is a Central Bank (CB henceforth) that has the monopoly of domestic 
currency creation. It also conducts alternative monetary policies. Having such a 
                                                 
42 Chang and Velasco (2000) use a money-in-the-utility function in their model.  
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monetary model allows me to study the effects of monetary policy on the efficiency and 
fragility of the financial markets. 
III.2 Environment 
Consider a small open economy that consists of an infinite sequence of two-
period lived, overlapping generations. Time is discrete and indexed by . The 
domestic economy consists of two symmetric locations: island A and island B. In each 
period and at each island, a continuum of agents with unit mass is born. Therefore in any 
given period, there is a population of young agents and a population of old agents at each 
island. Also in each period, there is a single tradable consumption/investment good 
which is homogenous across countries. This good can be freely traded across the border 
and there are no trade barriers.  
...,2,1,0=t
III.2.1 Endowments, Preferences, Assets and the Information Structure  
Each agent is endowed with w units of the good when young, but does not 
receive any endowments when old. Agents derive utility only from consuming when old. 
Therefore, here I do not have the preference shock that the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
utilize. However, agents face a relocation shock. Young agents face an uncertain 
outcome such that with probabilityπ , each young agent will be required to move to the 
other island at the end of her youth. Then, as of the end of her youth, each agent is of one 
of two types: a mover or a non-mover. Type realization is an i.i.d. process across young 
agents. Then, by the law of large numbers, π is also the fraction of movers in each 
generation. The fraction of movers is exogenously given and is public information at all 
times. Hence, while there is individual uncertainty in this economy, there is no aggregate 
uncertainty. Also, the information regarding a particular individual’s type is private, and 
her consumption and investment activities cannot be observed or verified by others.  
I assume that when movers are relocated to the other island, they can only 
transport currency43. I am allowing both domestic and foreign currencies to be carried to 
the other island. Also, I am not legally restricting the use of any one of the currencies as 
a means to purchase the consumption good at any location. Let  and denote the ∗tp tp
                                                 
43 The investment good or the consumption good cannot be transported across islands. 
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price of the good at time t in terms of foreign currency and domestic currency, 
respectively. Since the good is freely traded in the world market and I have a small open 
economy, I assume that  is exogenous and taken as given. More precisely, I assume 
that 
∗
tp
∗
+ +
= σ1
1
*
1
*
t
t
p
p
where is a constant parameter that represents the world inflation 
rate (WIR). Let denote the nominal exchange rate at time t such that units of the 
domestic currency can be used to purchase one unit of the foreign currency. 
∗σ
te te
Let  and 1ˆ +tc 1~ +tc denote the consumption amounts of an old agent that was born 
at time t if she is a mover and a non-mover, respectively. For simplicity, I use a 
logarithmic utility function such that )log()( γ+= ccu where γ  is a given parameter44. 
Then, as of her youth, an agent’s expected utility can be written as 
)~log()1()ˆlog()]~,ˆ([ 1111 γπγπ +−++= ++++ ttttt ccccUE .   (38) 
Following Diamond and Dybvig (1983), there is an illiquid technology available 
to agents and financial institutions of the domestic economy. One unit of the good 
invested at the beginning of period t before types are realized can be transformed into 
capital that yields R  units of the consumption good in period t+1. However, this is an 
illiquid asset in the sense that once one unit of the good is invested at the beginning of 
period t, an early liquidation after types are realized yields a return of s units of the good. 
Investment decisions must be made before types are realized. I assume 
that , ,sR > 2sR >
1+
>
t
t
p
p
R  and ∗+> σ1
1R . The first two of these assumptions imply 
that early liquidation of long-term investment is costly. The last two assumptions imply 
that the rate of return from long-term investment dominates the rates of returns from 
holding either the domestic or the foreign currencies between young and old age.  
As it is standard in the literature, one can easily show that in the environment 
described, coalitions of domestic agents organized as banks can achieve superior 
outcomes relative to autarky where agents make consumption and investment decisions 
                                                 
44 This particular functional form has some useful properties. One of those is that utility is bounded from 
below and above. 
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by themselves. Once again, this is because of the fact that while there is individual 
uncertainty in this economy, there is no aggregate uncertainty. 
III.2.2 The Representative Domestic Bank’s Problem 
The banking arrangement in this environment is described as follows. At time t, 
each bank45 offers a demand deposit contract that promises the following payments to its 
depositors in exchange for depositing w units of good when they are young: The agents 
who report themselves as movers are promised a payment of a portfolio of currencies 
that can buy xt units of the good in period t. The agents who report themselves as non-
movers are entitled to a payment of 1~ +tc  units of the good at t+1. Accepting this contract, 
agents deposit their entire endowment of w units of the good with the bank when they 
are young. The bank can invest these deposits in three available assets. It chooses to 
invest kt units of the good in the long-term asset. Also, it purchases mt and mt* units of 
the domestic and foreign currency, respectively. Then, the resource constraint faced by 
the bank before the types are realized is: 
wzzk ttt ≤++ *        (39) 
for all t where 
t
t
t p
m
z ≡  and *
*
*
t
t
t p
mz ≡  are holdings of real domestic and foreign currency 
balances respectively. Figure 3.1 illustrates the timeline of events in this economy. 
 
                                                 
45 “bank” henceforth stands for the representative bank owned by the generation that was born at time t. 
 80
Each young mover 
withdraws zt pt pesos 
& zt*pt*+slt pt* 
dollars from gen. (t) 
banks.
Young deposit 
w in gen. (t) 
banks. 
Old non-movers 
consume ct~  and die. 
Old movers consume 
and die. tcˆ
 
Note: Gen. stands for “generation”. 
FIGURE 3.1: TIMELINE OF EVENTS 
 
 
 After the types are realized in period t, the bank has to pay reported movers a 
combination of domestic and foreign currency balances that are equivalent in sum to xt 
units of the good in real terms. At this time, the bank’s resources include currency 
balances carried from the beginning of the period. If those balances are not sufficient to 
meet the payment obligations, the bank could liquidate lt units of the long-term asset 
before maturity. Then, the bank exchanges the proceeds from liquidation for foreign 
Gen. (t) is 
born with w 
endowment.
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buy zt pt pesos & zt*pt* dollars 
from the old movers in 
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pay ct~ to each 
old non-mover. 
Gen. (t-1) banks 
receive long-term 
investment 
proceeds.
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currency and completes its payments to reported movers in foreign currency. In 
separating equilibrium, number of depositors who withdraw at this period is equal to the 
number of movers. Therefore, the bank’s resource constraint is46: 
tttt slzzx ++≤ *π  for all t.     (40) 
Notice that the reported movers are going to exchange fiat currency holdings for goods 
at period t+1. The amount of consumption that each mover can buy at t+1 can be 
expressed as: 
*
1
*
*
1
*
*
1
1ˆ
+++
+ ++=
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
tt p
psl
p
pz
p
pzcπ .     (41) 
 When period t+1 arrives, the bank receives the proceeds from the non-liquidated 
part of the long-term investment. The bank has obligations of 1~ +tc  units of good with 
each depositor that withdraws at this period. Then, 
( ) 0,)(~1 1 ≥∀−≤− + tlkRc tttπ      (42) 
becomes the bank’s resource constraint at this period.  
 For the separating equilibrium to be incentive compatible, the bank has to give 
the right incentives to non-movers so that they do not misrepresent their type. If a non-
mover pretends as a mover and withdraws currency when young, the best she can do is 
to exchange the currency for goods when old. By (41), the amount of consumption 
goods that she can buy when old is equal to . To discourage misrepresentation of type 
by non-movers, the following incentive compatibility condition must hold: 
1ˆ +tc
11 ˆ~ ++ ≥ tt cc         (43) 
Finally, the following non-negativity constraints apply: 
0,, * ≥ttt lzz  and  for all t.     (44) 0, >tt xk
                                                 
46 Notice that this constraint is written in real terms. The actual payments to reported movers are made in 
fiat currency. That is, payment to each reported mover includes  units of domestic currency, 
units of foreign currency, and if there is any liquidation, units of foreign currency. Since the 
law of one price holds, that is, 
tt pz
**
tt pz
*
tt psl
*
t
t
t p
pe =  at all times, the resource constraint can be expressed as (40). 
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In summary, the representative bank owned by generation t chooses 
{ }*11 ,,,~,ˆ ttttt zzkcc ++  in order to maximize (38) subject to (39)-(44) taking 
{ } ...2,1,0,,,,,, * =tsRwpp tt π as given. 
III.2.3 Restrictions on Parameter Space 
 Assumption III.1 restricts the parameter space so that a financial system can 
provide some insurance against liquidation of the long-term asset. This assumption is 
maintained throughout the chapter. 
 Assumption III.1: The following condition is necessary and sufficient to 
ensure that zero liquidation of the long-term asset is optimal: 
( )
( ) ( *11 1ˆ )
~ σγ
γ +<+
+
+
+
s
R
c
c
t
t        (45) 
Proof: The first order condition of the bank’s problem with respect to lt being strictly 
negative yields (45). 
 The intuition with (45) is that the opportunity cost of liquidating the long-term 
asset, ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
s
R  needs to be large enough so that financial intermediation increases social 
welfare relative to financial autarky by avoiding liquidation. Notice that I had a similar 
condition in chapter II as well. 
III.3 Steady-State Equilibria with No Crises 
 In this section, as a first step, I find the steady-state equilibria of the model with 
no crises. I find two sets of steady-state monetary equilibria. In the first set, both 
domestic and foreign currencies are held in positive amounts in equilibrium. In the 
second set, only foreign currency is held in equilibrium. Which of the two sets is 
observed is determined by domestic monetary policy. If the growth rate of domestic 
money supply and hence the steady-steady domestic inflation rate is equal to 
international inflation rate, both domestic and foreign currencies are held in equilibrium. 
If, on the other hand, growth rate of domestic money supply is larger than foreign 
inflation, only foreign currency is held in equilibrium. Below, I present these sets of 
equilibria. 
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III.3.1 Market Clearing Conditions 
 The domestic currency market clearing condition can be expressed as 
t
t
t p
Mz =π2 .        (45) 
 Above, Mt denotes the total nominal supply of domestic currency in period t. The 
demand for real domestic currency balances per depositor is equal to zt. Notice that in 
separating equilibrium, only movers demand domestic currency. Since there are 2π 
movers in this economy, total demand for real domestic currency balances is 2πzt. The 
price level gets determined through the market clearing condition. Using (45), the 
domestic inflation rate can be expressed as 
1
11
+
++ =
t
t
t
t
t
t
z
z
M
M
p
p
.       (46) 
 For simplicity, assume that the Central Bank follows the policy of a constant 
growth rate of domestic money supply ( )σ such that )1(1 σ+=+
t
t
M
M
. Notice that I have 
assumed a fixed foreign price level and rate of inflation. Therefore, the market for 
foreign currency automatically clears at all times47. These assumptions imply that I have 
a floating exchange rate regime with the exchange rate being determined through the law 
of one price: *
t
t
t p
p
e = . 
III.3.2 Steady-State Equilibria and Implications 
 If both domestic and foreign currencies are to be held in positive amounts in 
equilibrium, the following no arbitrage condition must hold: 
*
*
11
t
t
t
t
p
p
p
p ++ = .        (47) 
 Using (46), (47) and the first order conditions of the bank’s problem, I obtain the 
following dynamic system: 
                                                 
47 Demand for foreign currency 2πzt* is instantly satisfied by the perfectly elastic international supply at 
the exogenous foreign price level. 
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A steady-state equilibrium can be defined as a set of allocations 
 such that: { }∞=++ 0*11 ,,,~,ˆ tttttt zzkcc
(i) (48) and (49) are satisfied, and 
(ii)  ,,, 1
**
1
*
1 kkkzzzzzz tttttt ====== +++
0,~~~,ˆˆˆ 2121 ≥∀==== ++++ tcccccc tttt . 
I find two sets of steady-state equilibria. The first set (equilibrium I) is the 
interior solution with  and . This equilibrium is illustrated on Figure 3.2 
as the points on the line with 
0, * >zz *σσ =
( )** σgzz =+  where ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −+−−= Rwg 111 ** σγπππσ . 
The consumption vector is unique across combinations of domestic and foreign real 
currency holdings along this line: 
 ( ) ( **1 1ˆ σσπ gc += ) and ( ) ( )[ ]*1~ σπ gwRc −−= .     (50) 
Also, social welfare is constant along the same line. If I denote the social welfare 
of a representative future48 generation by ( ) ( )cc ~1ˆ* ππσθ −+= , then 
( ) ( ) ( ) RwgR +⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+=
*
*
*
1
1 σσσθ .       (51) 
The second set (equilibrium II) is a unique point, a corner solution with 
( )**,0 σgzz ==  and . That is, if the growth rate of domestic money supply is 
larger than the international inflation rate, domestic currency holdings are completely 
substituted by foreign currency holdings at the steady-state. However, as stated above, 
*σσ >
                                                 
48 I am not considering the initial old generation at this point. 
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the consumption vector and hence the social welfare level is the same as with the first 
equilibrium. 
 
*z
 
FIGURE 3.2: STEADY-STATE EQUILIBRIA 
 
 
I find that given the international rate of inflation ( )*σ , domestic monetary policy 
is neutral with respect to welfare. There are two alternative monetary policy regimes: (i) 
growth rate of domestic money supply can be set equal to the international rate of 
inflation ( ), or (ii) the former rate can be set to be larger than the latter, ( ). 
Under both regimes, the steady-state consumption amounts are constant and given by 
(50). Consequently, the welfare level is also constant and given by (51). In cases 
where , there is no steady-state equilibrium. 
*σσ = *σσ >
*σσ <
The international rate of inflation has a negative effect on total real currency 
balances held in equilibrium. At both the first and the second steady-state equilibria, 
total real currency holdings are given by ( )** σgzz =+  where ( )*σg  is a decreasing 
z
Equilibrium I:  *σσ =
)( *σg
)( *σg Equilibrium II:   
*σσ >
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function of the world inflation rate (WIR). The implication is that when the WIR 
increases (decreases), the line in Figure 3.2 shifts inward (outward). As a consequence, 
steady-state total real currency holdings decrease (increase).  
There is an interesting relationship between the international inflation rate and 
domestic welfare. Consider the consumption amounts of movers and non-movers given a 
rise in the international inflation rate. By (50), movers consume less, non-movers 
consume more. The total effect is ambiguous and depends on the initial level of . It is 
easy to show that
*σ
( ) 0'' * >σθ . If the initial level of the international inflation rate is 
smaller (larger) than some critical level, then a rise in decreases (increases) welfare. 
Let me call this critical level the “turning point” and denote it by . By (51), the 
turning point level is given by: 
*σ
*
Tσ
( ) ( )
2
1
*
1
111 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+=+ γπσ
Rw
RT
      (52) 
This result is interesting in the sense that there is a possibility that the domestic 
economy may benefit from a larger world inflation rate if the initial inflation rate is 
already large. In this case, the positive effect from non-movers’ utility dominates the 
negative effect from movers’ utility on welfare, increasing total domestic welfare. 
III.4 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I study a small open economy with two fiat currencies (domestic 
and foreign) and an explicit banking system that is vulnerable to runs from its depositors. 
Deviating from previous literature, I treat fiat currencies as intrinsically useless. They 
are used merely as a means to carry value across two islands that make up the domestic 
economy. I assume spatial separation and limited communication of agents. As a first 
step, I present steady-state equilibria with no crises. I find that domestic monetary policy 
in the form of a constant growth rate of domestic money supply is neutral with respect to 
welfare. For both domestic and foreign currencies to be held in equilibrium, growth rate 
of domestic money supply must be equal to the world inflation rate (WIR). If the former 
rate is larger than the latter, domestic money is not held in equilibrium. The total 
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(domestic and foreign) real money balances held is negatively related to the WIR. The 
relationship between the WIR and domestic welfare is not trivial and depends on the 
initial level of WIR. If the initial level of the WIR is larger (smaller) than some critical 
level, then domestic welfare is positively (negatively) related with WIR. The implication 
is that in some cases a small open economy may benefit from a larger international 
inflation rate. 
 There are some interesting directions in which this chapter can be extended. For 
example, one can allow the possibility of a bank run by introducing a sunspot. If the 
sunspot is observed, then depositors check the liquidity position of banks. This liquidity 
condition would depend on fundamentals and possibly would interact with the domestic 
and international price levels. One of the challenges of such a study is the question of 
how prices are determined after the sunspot. Prices might be indeterminate and multiple 
equilibria could be observed. Another interesting question is the following. Once a bank 
run happens, what are the conditions under which a central bank (CB) should extend 
credit to troubled banks? Radelet and Sachs (2000) criticize the abrupt bank closures 
based on IMF prescriptions in the Asian crisis. At least in the short-term, it could be 
welfare improving if the CB could extend credit to illiquid banks instead of closing them 
down. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In this dissertation, I study international financial crises in emerging market 
economies. Specifically, I focus on Mexican (1995), Asian (1997) and Turkish (2001) 
financial crises. There are some characteristics common to all of these crisis episodes. 
First, many analysts believe that they were largely unanticipated by market participants. 
Second, they involved a rapid rise in foreign liabilities of the commercial banking 
system up until the crisis during which international creditors suddenly refused to 
rollover debt. Third, the banking systems in the crisis economies were newly liberalized 
but did not have effective regulatory and supervisory mechanisms in place (Radelet and 
Sachs 1998, 2000; Sachs, Tornell and Velasco 1996). 
 In Chapter II, I study a world general equilibrium model of international creditors 
on the supply side and domestic banks on the demand side of the international capital 
markets. Banks are allowed to borrow at various maturities and issue dates. In the first 
step, I present and discuss equilibria where no crises take place. One characteristic of 
those equilibria is multiplicity and indeterminacy. I observe two types of indeterminacy: 
in terms of (i) prices and (ii) quantities of debt borrowed. Interestingly, there is an 
apparent tradeoff between price indeterminacy and quantity indeterminacy. When the 
prices are more determinate, quantity vector is less determinate and vice versa. In the 
second step, I present and discuss equilibria where crises are allowed to take place. In 
my model, crises are triggered by a sudden shift of expectations. I assume that domestic 
depositors may observe a bad signal about the banking system. If they do, whether a 
bank run takes place or not depends on the liquidity condition of banks. According to 
this condition, banks are illiquid if and only if their potential liabilities (as opposed to 
actual) exceed their potential assets. If banks are illiquid, all depositors run to the banks 
for withdrawal and banks may fail. Potential liabilities of the banking system increase if 
banks have a larger stock of short-term debt due in period one. Banks’ potential assets 
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are given by the early-liquidation value of the illiquid investment. Then, liquidity crises 
are more likely if the equilibrium debt maturity is relatively short-term. Therefore, 
policies that are aimed at inducing a longer term maturity of foreign liabilities are 
supported49. Next, given debt maturity structure, a relatively large cost of liquidating the 
long-term asset before maturity implies a more fragile banking system. In the third step, 
given a domestic bank run, I consider international creditors’ optimal response. Facing a 
domestic liquidity crisis, they re-evaluate their original lending plans. If they find the 
banks insolvent, they stop lending and a sudden stop occurs. In this setting, the risk of a 
sudden stop depends on three parameters. First, if the international creditors highly 
discount future consumption over current consumption, a sudden stop is more likely. 
Second, if the creditors’ current income is small relative to their future income, they are 
more likely to stop lending. Third, if the cost of liquidating the long-term asset is small, 
then a sudden stop is more likely because the creditors choose to ask for immediate 
repayment instead of waiting for the long-term returns. The reason that I am able to 
assess the risk of a sudden stop is that there is the possibility of a rational bailout 
equilibrium under favorable conditions. 
 In Chapter III, I model an explicit banking system in the presence of two fiat 
currencies. My objective is to assess the role of monetary policy in a setting where banks 
are vulnerable to self-fulfilling runs. The most critical contribution of this model is the 
way it treats fiat currencies. To motivate demand for a fiat currency, the previous 
literature has assumed that fiat currency generates utility or output. Deviating from 
previous literature, I treat fiat currencies as intrinsically useless. They are used merely as 
a means to carry value across islands in my model. I assume spatial separation and 
limited communication of agents. I allow a domestic and a foreign currency to be freely 
traded in my model. As a first step, I present steady-state equilibria with no crises. I find 
that domestic monetary policy in the form of a constant growth rate of domestic money 
supply is neutral with respect to welfare. For both domestic and foreign currencies to be 
held in equilibrium, gowth rate of domestic money supply must be equal to the world 
                                                 
49 One example is Chilean style taxes on short-term capital flows. 
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inflation rate (WIR). If the former rate is larger than the latter, domestic money is not 
held in equilibrium. The total (domestic and foreign) real money balances held is 
negatively related to the WIR. The relationship between the WIR and domestic welfare 
is not trivial and depends on the initial level of WIR. If the initial level of the WIR is 
larger (smaller) than some critical level, then domestic welfare is positively (negatively) 
related with WIR. The implication is that in some cases a small open economy may 
benefit from a larger international inflation rate. 
 Below, I discuss some interesting extensions of the models studied in this 
dissertation. 
IV.1 Possible Extensions 
 In the model presented in Chapter II, I have studied sunspots that are 
domestically originated. Domestic depositors observe the bad signal about the health of 
the banking system. Then, according to the liquidity position of banks they run or do not 
run for withdrawal. An interesting extension would be to study sunspots that are 
internationally originated. International creditors would observe the bad signal and stop 
lending if they find domestic banks unable to pay its obligations given that all creditors 
refuse to rollover debt. In that case, domestic depositors would re-evaluate their original 
decisions and run if they find the banks unable to meet their obligations. 
 There is a common dilemma that was faced by the Central Bank of Turkey, Bank 
of Mexico and Bank of Thailand when there is a run on the commercial banking system 
caused by a fear of devaluation. There are two courses of action available to the central 
banker at this point. The central bank (CB) may act as a lender of last resort and extend 
credit to the commercial banking system. Then the withdrawals are going to be used to 
purchase foreign exchange from the CB. Then, under a fixed exchange rate regime, the 
CB may run out of reserves and face a balance of payments crisis and devaluation. Or 
alternatively, the CB may leave illiquid banks to their fate and face a financial 
meltdown. Under which set of fundamentals and situations should the CB choose to 
extend credit to domestic banking system? This policy question was emphasized by 
Akyüz and Boratav (2003) for the Turkish (2001) and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) 
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for the Mexican (1995) crises. One of the extensions of the model in Chapter III can be 
to endogenize the choice of the central bank acting as a lender of last resort or not. When 
making this decision, the CB can be assumed to maximize social welfare. The decision 
of the CB can be linked to the fundamentals and the current situation of the economy. I 
believe such a study would provide interesting policy implications. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
A.1 First Order Conditions for the No Crises Case 
We first write the first order conditions (FOC’s) of the representative bank’s and 
international creditor’s problems respectively. The expression next to the endogenous 
variable is the partial derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to that variable. If the 
expression is equal to zero, the solution is the “interior” one. Then the corresponding 
variable has a nonnegative finite value. If the expression is less than zero, then the 
corresponding variable is equal to zero. Lastly, if the expression is positive, then the 
corresponding variable has an arbitrarily large value. 
Bank’s Problem FOC’s: 
y
R
x
rd d +− 0101 :          (A1) 
y
rRd d 0202 :
−          (A2) 
y
r
x
d d 1212
1: −          (A3) 
y
R
x
sl −:           (A4) 
where )(1 010112
dd drsldx −+= π and 
[ ]ddd drRldrRRdRgy 1212020201 )(1 1 −−−++−= π . Notice that in the no crisis case, 
by assumption 1. The necessity or sufficiency of assumption 1 depending on the 
case will be proven for each case below. 
0=l
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International Creditor’s Problem FOC’s: First notice that since , there 
is no FOC for d
ss dmd 0102 −=
02
s. 
v
r
u
rd s 020101 :
β−          (A5) 
v
r
u
d s 1212
1: β+−          (A6) 
Where and . ss dndru 120101 −+= ss drmrdrv 0102021212 −+=
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2 
This proposition solves for the cases where long-term interest rates are equal to the 
compounded two short-term rates: 021201 rrr = . 
Case 1.A: I start with solving for the supply side as interior solution. Taking (A5) 
and (A6) as equalities, I find 021201 rrr =  and
021201
01020102010201
12
)1(
rrr
brmrrnrdrrd
s
s
β
ββ
+
−−++= . 
Combining the two, I get: 
12
01
010112 )1(11 r
bmrndrd ss βββ
β
+−+−++=       (A7) 
Now, I solve the demand side problem as interior solution. Using (A3), I get 
1201
1212
01 )1( rrR
Rgdrd
d
d
ππ
π
−+
−= . Combining (A1)-(A3), I find Rrrr == 021201 . Plugging the latter 
into former, I get: 
gd
R
rd dd π−= 121201           (A8) 
Notice that (A8) implies and grx 01= Rgy = . 
Using market clearing conditions (20)-(22) and Rrrr == 021201 , I combine (A7) and 
(A8). I find 
Rbgm
nr
/)1(01 +++= βπ
β  and β
βπ
n
bgmRr +++= ])1([12 . Amounts of debt 
dij cannot be determined. 
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¾ No liquidation condition )0( =l  requires that (A4) be strictly negative. This 
implies
Rbgm
ns
/)1( +++< βπ
β  must hold. 
¾ Incentive compatibility (IC) condition (6) requires 
Rbgm
nR
/)1( +++≥ βπ
β . 
This implies that 
gm
bnR
)1( βπ
β
++
−≥ is a sufficient condition for IC. 
Case 1.B.1: Here, the supply side is interior similar to case 1.A. Therefore, again 
 and (A7) must hold. 021201 rrr =
Now, I turn to demand side problem. Since d01d is interior, (A1) is equal to zero. This 
implies 
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Combining with the other two conditions (A2) and (A3) by taking them strictly positive 
(they are both at right corner), I get  and . Notice that equilibrium 
amounts of debt d
02rR > 1201rrR >
ij cannot be determined. 
By market clearing conditions, I combine (A7) and (A9) using . I get the 
polynomial: where
021201 rrr =
01121
2
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−−= m . The simulation results (available from 
author) show that the first root, 
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4
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−−−=  is negative for a wide range 
of reasonable parameter values. Therefore, I pick 
1
11
2
11
12 2
4
)2(
A
CABB
r
−+−=  as a 
function of r01. This shows a curve in the space of interest rates, i.e. regular equilibria. 
Normalized vector of interest rates is unique (see section 4.2). I also find that r12 is an 
increasing function of r01. By  and the fact that this curve passes through the 1201rrR >
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unique interest rate vector of case 1.A (interested reader can easily verify this), I find 
that 
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n
bgmRr +++< ])1([12 . 
¾ No liquidation  condition implies)0( =l 01rs < . This is satisfied only if 
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β . The latter implies 
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−≥ is a sufficient condition for IC. 
Case 1.B.2: Here, the supply side is again at interior solution. Therefore, again 
 and (A7) must hold.  021201 rrr =
The demand side problem has d02d right corner, which implies . Combining d02rR > 01d 
right corner and d12d interior conditions, I get . The latter condition implies: 1201rrR >
])1([)( 12010201021212 rrrdmrmgRdr
dd ππππ −++−+=     (A10) 
By market clearing conditions, I combine (A7) and (A10). Again, equilibrium amounts 
of debt cannot be determined, but interest rates are found to be on a curve in space of 
(r01, r12, r02). Assuming 1)1( ≠+ βπ , I find 
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12 . I find that r12 is an increasing (decreasing) function of r01 if 
1)1( <+ βπ  ( 1)1( >+ βπ ).  
¾ No liquidation condition implies
s
Rr <12 . A sufficient condition for no liquidation 
is found by imposing the latter condition for the maximum possible value of r12. 
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If 1)1( <+ βπ  (r12 is increasing in r01), then the sufficient condition for )0( =l  
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12. If 1)1( <+ βπ , then the sufficient condition 
is 1))(1( ≥+++ β
βπ
n
mgRb which implies 
))(1( mg
bnR ++
−≥ βπ
β . If 1)1( >+ βπ , 
then the sufficient condition is 1])1([ ≥+++ β
βπ
n
gmRb  which implies 
gm
bnR
)1( βπ
β
++
−≥ . Then I can write the sufficient condition as 
}
))(1(
,
)1(
max{
mg
bn
gm
bnR ++
−
++
−≥ βπ
β
βπ
β . 
Case 1.B.3: The supply side is again at interior solution. Therefore, again 021201 rrr =  
and (A7) must hold.  
Turning to demand side problem, I have d01d right corner. This implies 
])1[(
])([
])1[(
])1[(
1201
0201
1201
02
010112 rrR
mrmgRr
rrR
rRdrd dd ππ
π
ππ
ππ
+−
−+++−
+−> .    (A11) 
By d02d right corner, Rr <02 . By d12d right 
corner,
12
02
1212
120102
0112
)(])1([
r
rm
r
mgR
r
rrrdd dd ππππ −++−+< .    
 (A12) Using market clearing conditions and 021201 rrr = , I combine (A7) with 
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(A11) and get where 01121
2
121 >++ CrBrA
RbCgRRmbrnRBnmrrA )1()]1()1([)1()( 101101011 πβπβππβππβ −−=++++−−=+=
 
. Notice that the above is the same polynomial that was found in case 1.B.1, except here 
I have an inequality. This implies 
1
11
2
11
1212 2
4
)1(
A
CABB
rr
−−−=<  or 
1
11
2
11
1212 2
4
)2(
A
CABB
rr
−+−=> . Since 0)1(12 <r , only the latter condition is relevant. 
Therefore, case 1.B.1’s r12 values become a lower bound for r12 here.  
Again using market clearing conditions and 021201 rrr = , I combine (A7) and (A12) and 
get ββπ
βπ
nmr
bmgRr +−+
+++<
]1)1([
)1)((
01
12 . Notice that this is the same function found in case 1.B.2, 
except here I have the right hand side as an upper bound for r12. In summary, case 1.B.3 
interest rates fill the area between rates of cases 1.B.1 and 1.B.2.   
¾ No liquidation (NL) condition imposes a second lower bound on r12: 
2
22
2
22
12 2
4
A
CABB
r
−+−>  where )( 012 nmrsA += βπ , 
})1(})1(])1)(([{{ 012 RmrRnbmgRsB πβπβπ −+−−+++−=  and 
RbC )1(2 π−−= . This curve intersects the first lower bound r12(2) at sr =01 . 
This implies that the condition 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
++++++< Rbmg
n
Rbgm
ns
/))(1(
,
/)1(
min βπ
β
βπ
β  is necessary for zero 
liquidation.  
Also, I found that this curve has a smaller slope than r12(2). This implies that 
for , NL condition binds. For , rsr <01 sr >01 12(2) binds.   
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¾ Notice that by “d12d right corner” condition, ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ > 12rx
y . For IC condition ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ≥ 1
x
y  
to be satisfied, a sufficient condition is . For , a sufficient condition is 112≥r 112≥r
βnb ≥ . 
Case 1.C: Here, demand side is at the interior solution. Taking (A1)-(A3) as equal 
to zero, I find and (A8) holds. So far, this case is the same as case 1.A. 
However, here the supply side resolves the indeterminacy of d
Rrrr == 021201
ij. Supply chooses  
which implies . By , I get 
001 =sd
md s =02 001 =sd
021201
01020102
12 rrr
brrmrrnd s β
β
+
−−< .        (A13) 
By the condition , I get cornerrightd s12
)1(12
0212
12 β
β
+
−−<
r
bmrrnd s .        (A14) 
By market clearing conditions, mdd == 0201 ,0 . By (A8), I get 
12
12 r
gRd π= . Then, (A13) 
implies 
Rbgm
nr
/)1(01 +++< βπ
β . (A14) implies β
βπ
n
bgmRr +++> ])1([12 . 
¾ NL condition implies 
s
Rr <12 . This is possible only if Rbgm
ns
/)1( +++< βπ
β . 
¾ IC condition implies . A sufficient condition can be found by plugging in 
the minimum value of r
112 ≥r
12: 1
])1([ ≥+++ β
βπ
n
gmRb . Then, 
gm
bnR
)1( βπ
β
++
−≥  is 
sufficient for IC to hold. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3 
This proposition solves for case 2 where long-term rates are larger than compounded 
short-term rates: .  021201 rrr <
Case 2.A: I start with solving the supply side problem. Taking (A6) as equal to zero, 
I get 
 101
12
0212
12 )1( r
bmrrnd s β
β
+
−−=         (A15) 
Taking (A5) as strictly less than zero (since ) and combining with (A6), I 
get .  
001 =sd
021201 rrr <
Turning to demand side problem, I take (A2) equal to zero and get . Next, I take 
(A3) equal to zero and get 
Rr =02
1201
1212
01 )1( rrR
Rgdrd
d
d
ππ
π
−+
−= .       (A16) 
Taking (A1) strictly positive and combining with (A3), I get  .  1201rrR >
By market clearing conditions, mdd == 0201 ,0 . Plugging these into (A16) and 
combining with (A15) and the fact that Rr =02 , I get β
βπ
n
bgmRr +++= ])1([12 . Then, 
implies1201rrR > Rbgm
nr
/)1(01 +++< βπ
β . Also, plugging the value of r12 into (A15), I 
get
Rbgm
gnd
/)1(12 +++= βπ
βπ . 
¾ NL condition implies 
s
Rr <12 , which becomes Rbgm
ns
/)1( +++< βπ
β . 
¾ IC condition implies , which becomes 112 ≥r gm
bnR
)1( βπ
β
++
−≥ . 
Case 2.B: Since the supply side problem is the same as case 2.A, (A15) and 
 holds. Now I turn to demand side problem. Taking (A2) as equal to zero, I get 
. Taking (A3) strictly positive, I get  
021201 rrr <
Rr =02
1201
1212
01 )1( rrR
Rgdrd
d
d
ππ
π
−+
−> .        (A17) 
Taking (A1) strictly positive I get  
Rrr
RgrRrdd
d
d
)1(1201
010101
12 ππ
π
−+
+>         (A18) 
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Also, combining with (A3) strictly positive,  is obtained.  1201rrR >
By market clearing conditions, mdd == 0201 ,0  and 120102 rrRr >= . Combining (A15) 
and (A17), I get  
β
βπ
n
bgmRr +++< ])1([12 .         (A19) 
Combining (A15) and (A18), I get where 03123
2
123 >++ CrBrA
)()1(])1([)1(, 3013013 bmRRCandRgbmRrRnBrnA +−−=+++−−== πβπβπβπ . 
Simulation results (available from the author) show that for a wide range of parameter 
values, the first root ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−
3
33
2
33
2
4
A
CABB
 is negative and the second root 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −+−
3
33
2
33
2
4
A
CABB
 is positive. Therefore, the relevant condition is  
3
33
2
33
12 2
4
A
CABB
r
−+−> .        (A20) 
(A19) and (A20) together determine the set of equilibrium interest rates as depicted on 
Figure 5. These two conditions imply that r12 is an increasing function of r01. Also, they 
imply that
Rbgm
nr
/)1(01 +++< βπ
β . 
¾ NL condition implies
s
R
x
y < . This is very similar to the condition of “d01d right 
corner”: 
01r
R
x
y < . The latter condition implied (A20). The NL condition turns out 
to be the same as (A20) with sr =01 . That is, NL condition acts as a constant 
lower bound for r12: 
4
34
2
44
12 2
4
A
CABB
r
−+−>  where 
])1([)1(44 RgbmRsRnBandsnA βπβπβπ +++−−== . This means that 
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sr >01  is a sufficient condition for NL. For , sr >01 Rbgm
ns
/)1( +++< βπ
β  is 
necessary. 
¾ IC condition implies an upper bound for r12: 
5
55
2
55
12 2
4
A
CABB
r
−+−≤ where 
))(1(])1([)1(, 555 bmRCandRgbmRnBnA +−−=+++−−== πβπβπβπ . 
This upper bound never binds (IC condition is always satisfied) if the other upper 
bound (A19) is always smaller than this one. This is the case if 
gm
bnR
)1( βπ
β
++
−≥ , which is a sufficient condition. 
Case 2.C: Again, supply side problem is the same as in 2.A and 2.B. Therefore, 
(A15) and  holds.  021201 rrr <
Now I turn to demand side problem. Taking (A2) as equal to zero, I get . Taking 
(A1) as equal to zero, I get 
Rr =02
Rrr
RgrRrdd
d
d
)1(1201
010101
12 ππ
π
−+
+=         (A21) 
Combining this condition with “d12d right corner” (i.e. (A3) strictly positive), I get 
.  1201rrR >
Next, market clearing conditions imply mdd == 0201 ,0  and 120102 rrRr >= . Plugging 
these into (A21) and combining with (A15), I get . This is the 
same function that was found in case 2.B, although here I have equality: 
03123
2
123 =++ CrBrA
3
33
2
33
12 2
4
A
CABB
r
−+−= . These conditions determine equilibrium interest rates on a 
curve in the space of  as depicted on Figure 4. ),,( 021201 rrr
¾ NL condition requires . A necessary condition for the latter is sr >01
Rbgm
ns
/)1( +++< βπ
β . 
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¾ IC condition requires Rr ≤01 . A sufficient condition for the latter is 
gm
bnR
)1( βπ
β
++
−≥ . 
Case 2.D: Again, supply side problem is the same as in 2.A-2.C. Therefore, (A15) 
and  hold.  021201 rrr <
Now I turn to demand side problem. Taking (A2) as equal to zero, I get . Taking 
(A1) as strictly negative, I get 
Rr =02
Rrr
RgrRrdd
d
d
)1(1201
010101
12 ππ
π
−+
+< .        (A22) 
Market clearing conditions imply mdd == 0201 ,0 ,
12
0212
12 )1( r
bmrrn
d β
β
+
−−= and 
.  Using these conditions, (A3) being strictly positive implies (A19).  120102 rrRr >=
Combining market clearing conditions and (A22), I get . This is 
the same curve that was found in case 2.B. In this case, this curve becomes an upper 
bound for r
03123
2
123 <++ CrBrA
12. Notice that this upper bound together with imply (A19). 
Therefore (A19) does not bind. These relationships describe an irregular set of equilibria 
as illustrated on Figure 6. The lower bound for r
Rrr <1201
12 comes from the zero liquidation 
condition as explained below: 
¾ No liquidation condition c12ombined with market clearing conditions implies a 
constant lower bound for r12. This lower bound is the value of r12 on the same 
curve found in case 2.B when sr =01 . For zero liquidation, I find that 
Rbgm
ns
/)1( +++< βπ
β  is necessary because as s approaches the right hand side 
from below, r12 approaches β
βπ
n
bgmR +++ ])1([ from below. 
¾ IC condition implies an upper bound for r12. This is found from the roots of the 
function where06126
2
126 ≤++ CrBrA βπnA =6 ,
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])1([)1(6 RgbmRnB βπβπ +++−−= and ))(1(6 bmRC +−−= π . This upper 
bounds binds if and only if
gm
bnR
)1( βπ
β
++
−< . On the other hand, if 
gm
bnR
)1( βπ
β
++
−≥ , this upper bound does not bind.  
 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4 
Case 3.A.1: I start with solving for the supply side. Notice that implies 
. Using this and taking (A5) as equality, I get 
021201 rrr >
0, 0201 == ss dmd
021201
010102
12
)(
rrr
brnmrr
d s β
β
+
−+= .       (A23) 
Using (A23) and taking (A6) strictly positive, I get . 021201 rrr >
 Turning to demand side problem, taking (A2) strictly positive, I get . Taking 
both (A1) and (A3) as equal to zero, I get
Rr <02
Rrr =1201 and  
12
12
)(
r
gmRd d π+=  .        (A24) 
Market clearing conditions allow us to combine (A23) and (A24) and get 
)(
])([
12
02 gRnr
bgmRRr πβ
π
−
++=        (A25) 
Also, notice that  and (A25) implyRr <02 β
βπ
n
bgmRr +++> ])1([12 . As a result, 
Rbgm
nr
/)1(01 +++< βπ
β  must also hold. These relationships identify a locally unique 
set of equilibria as illustrated on Figures 7 and 8.  
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¾ By (A1) and (A3), zero liquidation condition implies 01rs < . 
Since
Rbgm
nr
/)1(01 +++< βπ
β , a necessary condition for zero liquidation is 
Rbgm
ns
/)1( +++< βπ
β . 
¾ From demand side problem, 12rx
y = . Then, the IC condition is equivalent to 
. This condition binds only if the other lower bound for r112 ≥r 12, 
β
βπ
n
bgmR +++ ])1([ is smaller than 1. Therefore, the IC condition does not bind 
if 
gm
bnR
)1( βπ
β
++
−≥ . The latter condition is a sufficient one for IC. 
Case 3.A.2: On the supply side, by , . Taking (A6) as 
equal to zero, I get  
021201 rrr > 0, 0201 == ss dmd
12
0112
12 )1(
)(
r
bnmrr
d s β
β
+
−+=       (A26) 
Taking (A5) strictly positive, I verify . 021201 rrr >
Turning to demand side, taking (A2) strictly positive, I get Rr <02 . Taking (A1) and 
(A3) equal to zero, I get Rrr =1201 and  
gd
R
rd dd π−= 121201        (A27) 
Market clearing conditions imply 1201020201 ,,0, rrRrRdmd =>== . Plugging these 
conditions in and combining (A27) and (A26), I get 
β
βπ
n
bgmRr +++= ])1([12 and Rbgm
nr
/)1(01 +++= βπ
β . Two of the three interest rates 
are uniquely determined. The equilibria are on the line described by . This is 
illustrated on Figure 7. Also, by (A27), 
Rr <02
12
12
)(
r
gmRd π+= . 
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¾ Zero liquidation condition implies 01rs < , for which a necessary and sufficient 
condition is
Rbgm
ns
/)1( +++< βπ
β . 
¾ IC condition holds if and only if , which holds if and only if 112 ≥r
gm
bnR
)1( βπ
β
++
−≥ . 
Case 3.B.1: Supply behavior is the same as case 3.A.1. Therefore, , 
and (A23) holds.  
021201 rrr >
0, 0201 == ss dmd
Turning to demand side problem, by (A2) positive, I have Rr <02 . Since d01d is interior, 
(A1) is equal to zero. This implies (A9). Taking (A1) equal to zero and (A3) positive, I 
get  . 1201rrR >
By market clearing conditions, 0212010201 ,0, rrrRdmd >>== . Plugging these into 
(A9), and then combining with (A23), I get 
)]()([
])([
0101
120101
02 gmRrnmr
bgmRrrrr πφβ
φπ
+−+
++=  where 1201)1( rrR ππφ +−= .   (A28) 
Combining the market clearing condition and (A28), I find the following lower 
bound for r
021201 rrr >
12: 
1
11
2
11
1212 2
4
)2(
A
CABB
rr
−+−=> where 
)( 01011 nmrrA += πβ , )]1()1([)1( 011 βπβππβπ ++++−−= gRRmbrnRB and
RbC )1(1 π−−= . This lower bound is the same function that was found to be equal to 
r12 in case 1.B.1. The upper bound for r12 comes from . These conditions 
identify this case as depicted on Figure 8. Also, by (A9), I get 
1201rrR >
φ
π )(01
12
gmRrd +=  where 
1201)1( rrR ππφ +−= . 
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¾ The zero liquidation condition becomes . Sincesr >01 Rbgm
nr
/)1(01 +++< βπ
β , 
a necessary condition for zero liquidation is
Rbgm
ns
/)1( +++< βπ
β . 
¾ The IC condition holds if and only if Rr ≤01 . Since Rbgm
nr
/)1(01 +++< βπ
β , a 
sufficient condition for IC to be satisfied is 
Rbgm
nR
/)1( +++≥ βπ
β . The latter 
implies 
gm
bnR
)1( βπ
β
++
−≥ . 
Case 3.B.2: Supply behavior is the same as case 3.A.2. Therefore, , 
. Also, taking (A6) as equal to zero, I get (A26). Taking (A5) strictly 
positive, I verify . 
021201 rrr >
0, 0201 == ss dmd
021201 rrr >
Turning to demand side, by (A2) positive, I have Rr <02 . Since d01d is interior, (A1) is 
equal to zero. This implies (A9). Taking (A1) equal to zero and (A3) positive, I 
get  . 1201rrR >
By market clearing conditions, 0212010201 ,0, rrrRdmd >>== . Plugging these into 
(A9), and then combining with (A26), I get the same polynomial that determines r12 as 
the one found in case 1.B.1. That is, 
1
11
2
11
1212 2
4
)2(
A
CABB
rr
−+−== where 
)( 01011 nmrrA += πβ , )]1()1([)1( 011 βπβππβπ ++++−−= gRRmbrnRB and
RbC )1(1 π−−= . The extra indeterminacy of interest rates in this case comes from the 
fact that I cannot determine r02. I only have . This identifies an irregular set of 
equilibria as depicted on Figure 9. Also, by (A9), I get 
021201 rrr >
φ
π )(01
12
gmRrd +=  where 
1201)1( rrR ππφ +−= . 
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¾ Zero liquidation condition is satisfied if and only if . 
Since
sr >01
Rbgm
nr
/)1(01 +++< βπ
β , a necessary condition for zero liquidation 
is
Rbgm
ns
/)1( +++< βπ
β . 
¾ The IC condition holds if and only if Rr ≤01 . Since Rbgm
nr
/)1(01 +++< βπ
β , a 
sufficient condition for IC to be satisfied is
gm
bnR
)1( βπ
β
++
−≥ . 
Case 3.C.1: Supply behavior is the same as case 3.A.1. Therefore, , 
and (A23) holds. Using (A23) and taking (A6) as strictly positive, I 
verify . 
021201 rrr >
0, 0201 == ss dmd
021201 rrr >
Turning to demand side problem, by (A2) positive, I have Rr <02 . The demand side 
behavior is the same as case 1.B.2. Combining d01d right corner and d12d interior 
conditions, I get . The latter condition implies (A10).  1201rrR >
Market clearing conditions imply 0212010201 ,0, rrrRdmd >>== . Plugging these into 
(A10) and combining with (A23), I get r02 as a function of the other two interest rates:  
  
)]()([
])1()([
0112
12011201
02 mgRnmrr
brmrmgRrrr +−+
+−++= ππβ
ππ .     (A29) 
Now, I need to plug (A29) into . When I do, I get a lower bound for r021201 rrr > 12; 
ββπ
βπ
nmr
bmgRr +−+
+++>
]1)1([
)1)((
01
12 . Notice that the lower bound above is what I found as the 
value of r12 in case 1.B.2. The upper bound for r12 comes from two sources:  
and the zero liquidation condition. Also, by (A10) and market clearing conditions, I 
get
1201rrR >
01
12
12 )1(
)( mr
r
mgRd ππ −++= . 
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¾ Zero liquidation condition is satisfied if and only if
s
Rr <12 . A necessary 
condition for the latter condition is 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
++++++< Rbmg
n
Rbgm
ns
/))(1(
,
/)1(
min βπ
β
βπ
β  
since [ ] ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ++++++> β
βπ
β
βπ
n
bmgR
n
bgmRr ))(1(,)1(min12 in this case. 
¾ The IC condition is satisfied if and only if . Since 112 ≥r
[ ]
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ++++++> β
βπ
β
βπ
n
bmgR
n
bgmRr ))(1(,)1(min12 , a sufficient condition for 
the IC condition is ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
++
−
++
−≥
))(1(
,
)1(
max
mg
bn
gm
bnR βπ
β
βπ
β . 
Case 3.C.2: Supply behavior is the same as case 3.A.2. Therefore, , 
. Also, taking (A6) as equal to zero, I get (A26). Taking (A5) strictly 
positive, I verify . 
021201 rrr >
0, 0201 == ss dmd
021201 rrr >
The demand side behavior is the same as case 1.B.2. Taking (A2) strictly positive, I 
get . Combining dRr <02 01d right corner and d12d interior conditions, I get . 
Taking (A3) equal to zero implies (A10). 
1201rrR >
Market clearing conditions imply 0212010201 ,0, rrrRdmd >>== . Plugging these into 
(A10) and combining with (A26), I get ββπ
βπ
nmr
bmgRr +−+
+++=
]1)1([
)1)((
01
12 . This is the same 
curve found in case 1.B.2. The only difference with that case is the fact that r02 is not 
determined here; . These conditions identify this case as a set of irregular 
equilibria depicted on Figure 11. Also, by (A10) and market clearing conditions, I 
get
021201 rrr >
01
12
12 )1(
)( mr
r
mgRd ππ −++= . 
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¾ Zero liquidation condition is satisfied if and only if
s
Rr <12 . Since 
[ ]
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ++++++> β
βπ
β
βπ
n
bmgR
n
bgmRr ))(1(,)1(min12 , a necessary condition for 
zero liquidation is ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
++
−
++
−≥
))(1(
,
)1(
max
mg
bn
gm
bnR βπ
β
βπ
β . 
¾ The IC condition is satisfied if and only if . 
Since
112 ≥r
[ ]
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ++++++> β
βπ
β
βπ
n
bmgR
n
bgmRr ))(1(,)1(min12 , a sufficient 
condition for the IC condition is ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
++
−
++
−≥
))(1(
,
)1(
max
mg
bn
gm
bnR βπ
β
βπ
β . 
A.5 Proofs of Illiquidity of Case 3 Equilibria 
  For cases 3.A.1 and 3.A.2, grx 01= . Illiquidity condition (15) holds if and only if 
, which had already been assumed by no liquidation assumption,  
(assumption 1). Therefore all equilibria are illiquid in these cases. 
sr ≥01 sr >01
  For cases 3.B.1 and 3.B.2, (15) implies  
)(})]1(11[{01 mgsm
RgRr +≥−++ φπφ       (A7)  
where 1201)1( rrR ππφ +−= . Notice that since Rrr <1201 , 1>φ
R . Also, 1)1(11 >−+ φπ
R . 
Therefore, the left hand side of (A7) is larger than )(01 mgr + . Since , by no 
liquidation assumption, (A7) is satisfied for all equilibria in these cases. In fact, I have 
just shown that in these cases, banks are more vulnerable than in cases 3.A.1 and 3.A.2. 
This is because the left hand side which indicates banks’ liabilities is larger. 
sr >01
  For cases 3.C.1 and 3.C.2, illiquidity condition implies 12rs
R ≥ , which is already 
satisfied by the previously derived conditions andsr >01 Rrr <1201 . Therefore, all 
equilibria in case 3 are illiquid.  
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